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The Editing Team (2019/2020):

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Editorial

Welcome to the first edition of The Historian this academic year. This edition has 10 excellent articles all by undergraduate students at the university. For this edition we encouraged a wide variety of topics and as such the articles cover a variety of themes across space and time.

Finn Tindal draws the interesting comparison between the relatively unknown Alessandro de’ Medici and the ideal Prince laid out in Machiavelli’s seminal work. He concludes that Medici was enormously successful, even if he did not always stick to Machiavelli’s blueprint.

Alice Gustinetti discusses the age-old question of why Rome fell, specifically, whether it was due to internal or external pressure. She concludes by questioning whether the question can be answered effectively, given how interconnected these factors are.

Piers Mucklejohn discusses attitudes towards death in Early Modern England. These attitudes were primarily concerned with death’s inevitability, the role it had in deciding a person’s fate and what that fate would be. Despite changes in the period, he argues that religion continued to dominate attitudes towards death.

Mary Skelton tackles the key question of whether nations are imagined communities, drawing on a wide range of evidence spanning continents and centuries. She concludes that while one may be able to give a nation a legalistic definition, its roots lie in culture.

Cai Green debunks the assertion that the Chilean coup in 1973 and the fall of Salvador Allende can be perceived as the “taming of the Left”. Instead, he argues that a radical leftist political movement continued after the coup, challenging the definition of revolutionary activism as only violent, while also giving a degree of agency back to the radical Chilean left.

Clara Baird delves into the public sphere in 16th to 18th century England by discussing what houses and their contents reveal about changes in English society. She argues that the main transition during the period was from houses being buildings of necessity to a commodity.

Ben Cope discusses the British Peace Movement immediately before the First World War. He takes the view that the movement was characterised by the involvement of two journalists, W. T. Stead and Norman Angell. He argues that the transition from one to the other was emblematic of the changes in the movement and that ultimately discussions of peace movements boil down to the question ‘what is war good for?’.

Liza Mashova looks at the decline of witch-hunting in England. She argues that while the decline of witch-hunting was partially caused by its internal contradictions, external factors were also at play. She also points to the need to discuss attitudes to belief and persecution in tandem to the decline of witch-hunting.

Tommy Maddinson looks at imperialism’s detrimental impact on the environment in British North America in the 18th and 19th centuries. He argues this was ultimately caused by different attitudes among the aboriginal people and the European colonialists. One saw nature as
something to live with and rely on, while the other saw it as something to use.

William Mirza takes a look at the political impact of the moon landings, just over 50 years ago. After looking at a wide range of impacts he speculates that perhaps our relationship with the moon simply represents the human condition.

Ben Cope and Cai Green

*The Historian* Editors 2019/2020
What do houses and their contents reveal about changes in English society between 1500 and 1750? – By Clara Baird

Houses designed during 1500 to 1750 transitioned from defensive dwellings to revolutionary residences built to display wealth and for stately elite competition. However, the emergence of the Great Rebuilding during the sixteenth century of greater, more durable vernacular houses and growing continental influences opened up by greater travel links, stress the changing desire for comfort and specialisation within the home. The fundamental transition in consumption meant society changed from needing objects of necessity to ones of emulation and domesticity as England integrated into the international trade markets. Therefore, the domestic sphere was changing from one of displaying authority in the community to ‘polite’ architecture, which was thus reflected in the house’s contents. During the 1500s, houses built by the elites of society often changed in architectural style due to the emergence of chivalry. With defensive, ‘castle-shaped’ dwellings being the early medieval template of elite power, arranged in courtyards as defensive enclosures, the Tudor gentleman revolutionised this style of architecture to create the ‘prodigy house’ (see Figure 1).

Materials, especially the multitudes of glass used to create these houses reflected wealth, ‘refinement and social distinction’, as they were overly expensive and often led to debt and ruin.¹ The earliest print in Gervase Markham’s ‘The English Husbandman’ began the soon prevalent ideal of splitting houses into rooms for casual entertainment, which became split by a long ‘hierarchical’ hall whilst the exterior ought to be embellished with turrets to ‘distinguish’ gentlemen from their lower class counterparts.² Therefore, as changing social preferences altered the interior of the house to reflect growing privacy concerns and for ‘cultural self-expression’ during peer activities in separate communal living spaces, the exterior therefore developed to reflect this.³ These men wanted to distinguish themselves as a class separate from others, as well-bred, educated and powerful members of society. This is reflected in house records from one of the most educated and prevailing Tudor gentlemen William Cecil. He created barrel-vaulted, stone stairs at his mansion in Burghley, built by imported ready-made stone, a building that had neither precedent nor parallel in England. Thus, in creating these cold, impractical, but competitive displays of aristocracy during a period where monarchical support, and often unexpected visits from the monarch was rife, ‘visual representation’ to create social identity became more important.⁴ Later on, heading towards the eighteenth century, elite houses completely transformed from this prior ‘medieval patriarchy’ style of architecture to the emergence of room specialisation due to emerging ideas of comfort.⁵ By the beginning of the 1700s, the necessity and grandeur of the great hall as a social meeting point began to diminish, declining ‘from 94% to 31%’ in Kent.⁶

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⁶ Ibid, p. 129.
became just an entrance or passageway to the new specialised living rooms or work specific spaces, especially for home brewing and buttery.\(^7\) The need for more privacy and civility meant rooms became more particular, changing from ‘dining parlours’ to ‘dining rooms’, whilst the hall became less of a symbolic meeting space for hosts to welcome neighbours and guests into the grandeur of their homes, being lowered down to one story whilst the main chamber of the house was placed above.\(^8\) Among these houses is John Aubrey’s house, Easton Piers, built in the late 1650s, and possibly the first English home to be called a villa, a term familiar to contemporaries as the ancient Roman mode of cultivated retirement.\(^9\) The taste for architectural simplicity was an aspect of a broader and deeper change in the mental climate, moving from humanist ideals of public service, due to emerging continental influences of Palladianism (see Figure 2), which led to a common style of architecture among the elite. This move to architectural mixes of ‘Englishness and exoticism’ led to growing societal virtues being placed upon Dutch tastes of less decadence, in comparison to French styles which were viewed as ‘unpatriotic and unmanly’.\(^10\) This massive shift to comfort and step away from elite flamboyance moved items such as mirrors, ‘pictures and clocks’ from the front rooms where guests would first enter to private chambers, changing their use to more a ‘utilitarian’ purpose.\(^11\) However, there are limits to this historiography, as appraisers often didn’t list all the rooms in the house, especially if they contained either no goods or goods which didn’t belong to the owner, but instead to a tenant or child.\(^12\)

Vernacular houses during this time differed greatly from the great stone monstrosities of their elite counterparts. The materials of houses during the sixteenth century often reflected what was readily available in society. As stone was too heavy to transport for the lower classes, regional practical styles developed in these ‘mean houses’ (see Figure 3), made from earthy elements such as wattle and daub.\(^13\) As Carew, a Cornish antiquary working in 1602 wrote in his Survey of Cornwall, husbandmen had earthy walls and ‘low thatched roofes’ with only one hole for the fire and ‘straw and blanket’ beds that developed during this period into a ‘civility to the eastern pattern’.\(^14\) Folklife scholars view these transforming late sixteenth century buildings in a romantic way, as testimonials to a vanished way of life that was somehow more authentic than that of their elitist counterparts. For these folk fanatics, the ‘witchcraft precautions and marks of craftsmanship of the saw’ became an eloquent testament to an ancient time, reflecting the poorer society’s pride and prestige in these hand-built ‘genius loci’.\(^15\) These houses therefore held a vast amount of emotional attachment as the beams of wood were often painted black both to emphasise how vernacular dwellings were, to some extent, just a smaller imitation of elitist houses, but also how a vast amount of pride locally was put upon these small wooden houses.

However, the transformation in vernacular houses that emerged during the so called ‘Elizabethan revolution’, otherwise known as the ‘Great Rebuilding’, when medieval-style houses physically modernised and furnishings inside increased leading to bigger, more durable houses. Monmouthshire Houses

\(^{7}\) Ibid, p. 131.
\(^{8}\) Cooper, ‘Rank, Manners and Display: The Gentlemanly House, 1500-1750’, p. 297.
\(^{9}\) Ibid, p. 301.
\(^{10}\) Johanna Ilmakunnas and Jon Stobart, A taste for luxury in early modern Europe: display, acquisition and boundaries (Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), p. 156.
\(^{11}\) Overton, Production and Consumption in English Households, 1600-1750, p. 135.
\(^{12}\) Ibid, p. 121
\(^{13}\) Ibid, p. 122.
\(^{15}\) Johnson, English houses, 1300-1800: vernacular architecture, social life, p. 11-13.
writers realised that the boom in ‘revolution’ was often due to rising economic benefits yeomen began to reap during Tudor periods after extreme plague years. Yeomen decided to spend their disposable incomes on transforming their houses and creating investment opportunities for those who were up and coming in society. This class was dealing with ‘relatively fixed expenses’ and ‘steadily rising selling-prices’, the fixed rent prices and tenure inherited from centuries earlier aided raising labour wages.  

Therefore, the emergence of ‘hall-houses’ (see Figure 4) turned to the interior structure, with raft rooftops being divided with a new floor, and that in turn had staircases or portioned rooms with new windows and fireplaces, with floors extending to the sky. Thus, the replacement of old vernacular architecture by ‘polite’ or ‘pattern-book’ architecture emerged due to the yeomen’s growing desire for elite-like domesticity and comfort. Often, housing reformers encouraged readers to acknowledge that if cottagers had a ‘warm, cheerful’ house, similar to those of men from the higher spheres, the applied moral humanity and emotions give a set of imperatives for comfort, so men not of a yeomen status would work better. These internal changes were even immortalised through the rise of seventeenth century literature. Writers such as Defoe, writing his novel Robinson Crusoe played on these new ideologies of comfort being the key to a thriving household, happiness, and familial survival rather than simplicity. In his writings, Crusoe is shown to have ‘improved on his housing by building a wall and a thatched roof over the cave opening behind his tent’, a multi-purpose space, with a magnificent kitchen, dining room, and even cellar. However, the progression of society’s want for specialisation and comfort wasn’t only reflected in the architecture of houses, but even in the internal structure, concerning the change of possessions bought. For those living in poverty in the sixteenth century, household objects were limited to income and what could be bought locally. Memoirs and recollections written by Scottish yeomen, such as E.G. Robertson argue that these farmers owned less and lived in smaller houses, with little space for more than the basic necessities of ‘benches tables and cooking utensils’ on the ground floor, with farmhands often living in the loft above in commercialised farms. Therefore, yeomen often never owned the newer, decorative expensive items that have been shipped with high tariffs from abroad, such as china or pictures. Even earthenware, a basic functionality occurred less frequently than found in gentry inventories. However, this didn’t mean that their simplistic products were never a source of pride for yeomen. Spending on domestic furnishings went primarily into fabrics, especially for bedding and clothing as they provided psychological and physical satisfactions: they asserted status, displayed wealth, and provided protection from the elements that peasants couldn’t afford, transforming them into ‘as much a place as a thing’. The lack of objects in husbandmen’s houses reflected a hierarchal step down from yeomen which emphasise the tight rural societies and local productivity that summarised this early age of sea transportation; their rooms very bare and usually only around three in number, with the

17 Overton, Production and Consumption in English Households, 1600-1750, p. 124.  
20 Ibid, p. 766.  
house itself often sub-let as they worked for craftsmen who owned the land. As the early seventeenth century began, items became more important and varied as distinctions between social classes became based on material wealth and reputation in communities. Emerging ‘books of courtesy’ developed the ideals of the medieval period, where household objects needed to be tidy and orderly in order to keep spaces clear for different social activities.\(^{24}\) Therefore, as rooms began to become more specialised for social needs, goods often played a stronger social role as growing expectations of elites was put towards innovation and attempts to emulate their neighbours, whilst ideas of domestic comfort simultaneously changed with these. Before the eighteenth century, the idea of luxury often meant for people, especially Christian philosophers a moral bankruptcy and ‘corruptions of character’, but the meaning began to change and become the antonym of ‘necessity’ they viewed as linked with poverty and death, and so material substance became intertwined and more heavily based on social mobility.\(^{25}\) This changed to a source of national pride as people wanted ownership of more goods. Manufacturing wages rose higher than any other in Europe as the slave trade flourished, and so international openings meant people could afford the best things, or mass-produced copies. Commercial activity was bustling by the early 1700s as international trade shifted not just to importing goods to Europe, but also to wider horizons such as the Atlantic and Indian Oceans in a ‘commercial revolution’.\(^{26}\) Due to this, ownership of goods became widespread, as all social strata’s bought items associated with ‘elegance and gentility-notably’, the ‘aesthetic presence’ heightened by items such as mirrors and upholstery.\(^{27}\) Larger-scale capitalist items became open to the upper classes as society fundamentally transformed into a consumer civilisation and integrated into the international trade markets, whilst the lower classes began to be able to afford items beginning to be produced in Britain of the same quality and style. Nicholas Barbon, a physician interested in London estate development presented an analysis of the growing consumer society during the early 1700s, argued that objects reflected the growing ideas of pomp and comfort. Civil interests, he viewed, were only gained through government whilst class was bought through parading money.\(^{28}\) Therefore, due to an emerging recognition of emotional theory and history being an increasingly popular way to view the past, historians have recently put a new emphasis on objects not being for social benefit, but for physical ‘safety and security’ needs.\(^{29}\) Altogether, people shape the objects they buy and the homes they build, but there is the prevalent idea that objects and houses also shape the people. Therefore, houses and objects in the 1500s reflect the social status of the individual living inside. Houses for both were a source of pride and emulation in their local community, no matter how simplistic or basic the house was. As ideals of domesticity changed the exterior of houses and their interior use, the development of international trade allowed people for the first time from a range of social classes to buy both high value foreign possessions and mass-produced replicas both for their own comfort and a demonstration of their wealth.

\(^{24}\) Ibid p.5.

\(^{25}\) Crowley, The Sensibility of Comfort, p. 760.


\(^{27}\) Weatherill, Consumer behaviour and material culture in Britain 1660-1760, p. 189.

\(^{28}\) Crowley, The Sensibility of Comfort, p. 761.

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Appendix: House Photographs

Figure 1

Limestone mansion built for Sir William Cecil
Figure 2

‘The Great Dining Room at Houghton Hall, designed by William Kent, 1743. Museum no. 20603:5’

Figure 3

A clay or mud and straw cottage built in Taliaris, Wales

Figure 4

Hacton Cruck hall-house made of timber
‘W. T. Stead and Norman Angell characterised the British Peace Movement from 1899-1914’. Discuss
– By Ben Cope

“War, huh, yeah, what is it good for, absolutely nothing!”.

One would think that Edwin Starr had powerfully summarised the one belief that would unite all peace movements. Unfortunately, “good” can be interpreted in two ways here. It could mean the absolute objection of the principle of war, or it could describe the somewhat softer sentiment that war does not benefit anybody. Both beliefs are anti-war, and could find themselves in a peace movement, but they are not the same. The British Peace Movement from 1899-1914 had both these mentalities. It was made up of “a considerable number of unfamous people” who operated in a plethora of organisations who all had different goals and different means of getting there. This complication is one of the reasons why historians have paid little attention to this peace movement. That, and, of course, the anachronistic truism that this peace movement laboured under false pretences as World War One (WWI) broke out at its end. This peace movement’s complexity and its apparent irrelevance has led to a surprising lack of scholarship. Martin Caedel’s book is the first comprehensive study of the British Peace Movement. There were partial attempts made in the 1930s and a few later studies which dealt with elements of it. While a few have followed Caedel’s lead more recently, the coverage has been sparse at best.

Recently, the scholarship has reflected the second interpretation of Starr’s mantra. They argue that the British Peace Movement from 1899-1914 was dominated by Britain’s long-

31 Whitfield and Strong, War.
term attachment to Cobdenism. Cobdenism was the doctrine of Richard Cobden. Politically active in the mid-nineteenth century, he campaigned for free trade cosmopolitanism, whereby freer trade led to increasing democratisation and peace. The debate between Cobdenism and its ideological adversary economic nationalism dominated discourse in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. As peace was a fundamental part of Cobdenism and no country was dominated by it more than Britain, there has been a tendency for historians of this new school to cut through the short-term debates in the British Peace Movement from 1899-1914 and draw a straight line from Cobden’s cosmopolitanism to all peace movements. While this new conceptualisation of the political economy of much of the world in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries has been transformative, it simplifies the peace movement to the point of mischaracterisation. The British Peace Movement from 1899-1914 was not just part of a wider movement towards Cobdenism, but rather a period of transition from the first to the second interpretation of Starr’s phrase, i.e. that war is good for “absolutely nothing”. This transition was recognised but misdiagnosed by earlier historians due to their lack of understanding about Cobdenism. James R. Andrews distinguished between a “religious” and a “political” peace movement, but rather there was a religious peace movement, dominated by traditional peace associations and methods, and an economic peace movement informed by Cobdenism. By understanding this transition, we can gain a better understanding, not only of how it really was, but also of the development of fundamental ideas related to our recent history.

This is where we join the subjects of the essay: W. T. Stead and Norman Angell. Stead, a pioneering journalist by trade, was a latecomer to the peace movement. But once he committed himself to it, he worked tirelessly to unite a flagging peace movement around traditional peace associations and methods using his devout Christian faith and

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journalistic prowess.\textsuperscript{46} Angell, a journalist also, achieved fame when he wrote the extended version of \textit{Europe’s Optical Illusion} in 1910, titled \textit{The Great Illusion}.\textsuperscript{47} He did not argue, as is commonly assumed, that future war was impossible.\textsuperscript{48} But rather, due to economic interdependence, war was no longer economically beneficial, even for the victor.\textsuperscript{49} While Angell was late to acknowledge it, his ideas owed a great deal to the theories espoused by Cobden several decades earlier.\textsuperscript{50}

These two men, these two journalists, did not single-handedly drive the British Peace Movement between 1899-1914. Rather, they characterised the political economy of the peace movement, including that of Radicals and the women’s peace movement. Stead dominated the beginning of the period. He drove the campaign leading up to the successful First Hague Conference in 1899, uniting traditional peace associations around long-established methods and Christian morality.\textsuperscript{51} In the middle of the period, Stead became out of touch. The traditional peace movement was out of step with a country worried about the Boer War and later, the rising tensions with Germany.\textsuperscript{52} The Cobdenites were beginning to fill the vacuum left by Stead but were yet to fully emerge from his shadow.\textsuperscript{53} Towards the end of the period Norman Angell came to the fore. The phenomenal success of his book tapped into the Cobdenite political economy that had been lying latent in the British Peace Movement. The economic focus also satisfied a nation anxious about growing tensions with Germany.\textsuperscript{54} Ultimately, the British Peace Movement from 1899-1914 was a movement in transition from religion to economics, from Stead to Angell. In 1980, Sandi Cooper wrote that “the generation of peace workers who toiled... [before WWI] almost entirely shed the religious mantle of their mid-century forebears”.\textsuperscript{55} This transition has largely been lost in contemporary scholarship. Stead and Angell characterised this movement because they were emblematic of the political economies that were transitioning in this period. We need to better understand this transition and put it in the context of what we now know about the wider political economy of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. Stead’s push for unity around traditional peace associations using traditional methods, all driven by his unshakable attachment to religion, characterised the British Peace Movement at the start of this period. The successful Hague Conference in 1899 showed this. Traditional peace movements, such as the International Arbitration and Peace Association, supported the Conference, yet it was Stead who applied himself in the build-up.\textsuperscript{56} He used his publication \textit{The Review of Reviews} as a megaphone for his campaign while also launching a new weekly journal called \textit{War Against War: A Chronicle of the Peace Crusade}.\textsuperscript{57} In 1898 he left London for a “personal ‘Pilgrimage of Peace’” across Europe to drum up support for the Conference.\textsuperscript{58} Stead was also a “zealous advocate” of the traditional method of arbitration, claiming it unified the Conference

\textsuperscript{46} Brown, W. T. Stead, pp. 165-202.
\textsuperscript{51} Brown, W. T. Stead, pp. 165-178.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, pp. 178-198.
\textsuperscript{54} Caedel, \textit{Living the Great Illusion}, pp. 87-142.
\textsuperscript{57} Laity, \textit{The British Peace Movement 1870-1914}, pp. 146-152; Brown, W. T, Stead, p. 175.
around a “single, ‘practical’ aim”.59 Lastly, Stead used emotive and religious language to create a popular clamouring for peace. At the National Convention in March 1899, the culmination of Stead’s “Pilgrimage of Peace”, he pulled on people’s Christian morality, calling for a “revival of national consciousness” to avoid the “terrible judgment to come”.60 Stead’s direct influence on the outcome of the Conference is impossible to gauge. However, he was certainly in-tune with the political economy of the time. The twenty-six countries in attendance agreed on the establishment of the College of Arbitrators which was made up of members of different states.61 It was entirely optional, and therefore far from the creation of international law. Nevertheless, it was the peace movement’s most significant international success and the culmination of fifty years of campaigning. Stead’s biographer Frederic Whyte claimed that “those weeks at the Hague were among the happiest and most successful of Stead’s whole life”.62 Stead’s religious drive for unity and tradition was representative of the wider peace movement around 1899. This was shown by the women’s peace movement. Women’s peace movements have existed as long as states. It was entirely optional, and therefore far from the creation of international law. Nevertheless, it was the peace movement’s most significant international success and the culmination of fifty years of campaigning. Stead’s biographer Frederic Whyte claimed that “those weeks at the Hague were among the happiest and most successful of Stead’s whole life”.62 Stead’s religious drive for unity and tradition was representative of the wider peace movement around 1899. This was shown by the women’s peace movement. Women’s peace movements have existed as long as states.

64 D’Iriti, p. 123; Liddington, p. 15.

65 Although an absolutist pacifist, Robinson "aimed to promote cross-organisational co-operation" between traditional peace associations.66 The women’s peace movement around 1899 therefore mirrored Stead’s movement by focusing on unity to achieve traditional ends through traditional means. A staunch feminist himself, Stead characterised the women’s peace movement in more ways than one.67 The middle of the period marked Stead’s fall and a transition within the British Peace Movement. Stead’s failure during the Boer War was mirrored by the traditional peace associations. This left a vacuum in the peace movement. Cobdenite groups, from Radicals to women’s peace activists, began to rise up, but they did not yet have popular appeal nor independence from Stead’s movement. The failure of the Second Hague Conference in 1907 symbolised this period of transition. The Boer War was critical to Stead’s fall. Stead failed here because of his botched coverage of the war, Britain’s initial war-fever and his increasingly outdated methods. Stead’s desire for a Christian empire led him towards a friendship with Cecil Rhodes.68 When, in the 1890s, Rhodes’ job was threatened, Stead launched a campaign which “helped rescue him from obscurity”.69 The friendship soured once Stead became aware of Rhodes’ imperial motivations for the Boer War, and Stead began a pro-Boer campaign in Britain.70 He revamped his journal, calling it War Against War in South Africa, wrote the pamphlet Shall I Slay My Brother Boer? An Appeal to the Conscience of Britain, and named the ‘Stop the War’ committee.71 But despite Stead’s...
efforts, the campaign was a failure.\textsuperscript{72} Stead’s acute “sense of guilt and responsibility” for his earlier coverage did not mitigate his loss of credibility.\textsuperscript{73} Stead’s anti-war stance was also out of touch with Britain’s initial war-fever which was driven home by the pro-war press.\textsuperscript{74} Lastly, Stead’s style of campaigning was out of touch with a changing Britain. Stead remained rooted to the Christian moralising and sensationalism that had brought him journalistic success.\textsuperscript{75} Stead spoke of the impending “final catastrophe of a blood feud to the death between Dutch and British” in the final issue of \textit{War Against War}.\textsuperscript{76} Understandably, “Stead [became] a symbol of puritanical nonconformity” which did not fit with Britain’s “growing secularisation and hedonism” exacerbated by the initial war-fever.\textsuperscript{77} The eventual war-weariness was therefore caused by the war dragging on, not Stead’s belated success.\textsuperscript{78} Stead’s failure was mirrored by the traditional peace associations. This was shown most spectacularly by the Peace Society. Caedel claims they justified inaction by “hastily inventing a couple of doctrines”.\textsuperscript{79} Incredibly, one Quaker newspaper posed the question “is there anything we can do?”, before answering it “we must confess there is not”.\textsuperscript{80} For the Quakers, much like the traditional peace movement, the time before WWI was a period of transition.\textsuperscript{81} This left them unable to effectively campaign for peace at the vital moment. This makes Caedel’s rebuke of the Peace Society’s “timid” response to the Boer War slightly unfair, but his analysis rings true regardless.\textsuperscript{82} While the Peace Society’s capitulation was near total, it was not the only traditional peace association to fall short in these middle years. The International Arbitration League found that their “resources were altogether insufficient to undertake an anti-war campaign” and might well have collapsed if it’s secretary William Cremer had not donated most of the prize money from his 1903 Nobel Peace Prize win to keep the organisation going.\textsuperscript{83} The failure of the traditional movement left a vacuum in the British Peace Movement which was beginning to be filled by Cobdenites. Yet they either lacked popular appeal or an independence from the traditional movement. While the war’s initial popularity questioned Radicalism’s premise that “the people were naturally peaceful”, the war gave them the opportunity “to revivify Cobdenite ideas”.\textsuperscript{84} J. A. Hobson’s \textit{Imperialism: A Study} was central to this. Hobson argued that the “maladjusted capitalism” of imperialism distorted free trade which could lead to war.\textsuperscript{85} However, one must not overstate Hobson’s importance just because he fits within the Cobdenite framework. \textit{Imperialism} “spoke to only a small fraction of liberal elites” and initially “fell on rather stony ground”.\textsuperscript{86} “This was no abstract battle fought in the pages of academic journals” but a war fought for in the thoughts and actions of ordinary people.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{72} Paul Laity, \textit{The British Peace Movement} 1870-1914, pp. 157-158;  
\textsuperscript{73} Baylen, p. 314; Brown, \textit{W. T. Stead}, p. 183.  
\textsuperscript{75} Brown, \textit{W. T. Stead}, p. 200.  
\textsuperscript{79} Caedel, \textit{Semi-Detached Idealists}, p. 160.  
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Herald of Peace} (November 1899), p. 290.  
\textsuperscript{81} Kennedy, pp. 356-357.  
\textsuperscript{82} Caedel, \textit{Semi-Detached Idealists}, p. 162.  
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Arbitrator} (June 1902), p. 68; Caedel, \textit{Semi-Detached Idealists}, p. 172.  
\textsuperscript{87} Howe, \textit{Free Trade and Liberal England}, p. 270.
Cobdenism also became more popular in the women’s movement. Here, it was no abstract battle of ideas. Fuelled by the “internationalist optimism” of Bertha von Suttner’s seminal *Lay Down Your Arms*, Emily Hobhouse embarked on an anti-war campaign which had distinctly liberal, not religious, roots. However, when she travelled to South Africa in 1900 to provide relief, her work began to resemble that of Stead’s. Her book *The Brunt of War and Where it Fell* was a moving, moralising account designed to sway the public’s perception of the war. Similarly, she concluded that the traditional method of arbitration was the solution to the crisis. Therefore, while the vacuum left by Stead in the peace movement was beginning to be filled by next generation Cobdenites, it lacked either popular appeal or independence from Stead’s movement. The failed Second Hague Conference in 1907 symbolised this period of transition. The Conference, like the peace movement, was without direction and ultimately a failure. While Stead did all he could to affect the Conference, he was already irrelevant, and the failed clamouring for peace came from Cobdenite Radicals, not Stead. Bolstered by the Liberal’s election victory in 1906, the Radicals went into the Conference with an “aggressive confidence”, promising “to make war on war”. They pushed for a reduction in armaments, a traditional peace method, to no avail. The Conference achieved very little. This was not helped by the lacklustre tone set by the president’s opening address, where he urged delegates, “let us not be too ambitious”. Stead cut an angry and forlorn figure during the Conference. He endlessly criticised the British delegates, saying he had “seldom seen a more miserable and scandalous debacle”. But Stead was out of touch. Shortly after the Conference, Stead tried to drum up support for another “Pilgrimage of Peace”, but most “poured cold water on his scheme”. The “grandiose” plan was too “romantic and optimistic” for a time when relations across Europe were becoming alarmingly tense. Angell’s remarkable success after 1910 completed the British Peace Movement’s transition to bring it in line with modern scholarship on economic Cobdenism. While the traditional peace movement continued to operate and Radicalism even enjoying a slight boost in these years, they played second fiddle to Norman Angell. Although the London Universal Peace Conference of 1908 was attended by esteemed guests, such as David Lloyd George and Herbert Asquith, the recognition of the conference by establishment figures owed to rising tensions with Germany rather than a reinvigorated religious movement. Indeed, much to the dismay of the Quakers who organised much of the Conference, Asquith used his speech to emphasise the importance of “self-defence”. Additionally, as Peter Cain argues, Radicalism’s increasing support in these years was largely due to Angell’s popular influence.

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88 Liddington, pp. 43, 46.
90 Liddington, pp. 57-58.
91 Ibid, p. 57.
97 Whyte, p. 291.
101 *The Times*, (1 August 1908), p. 11.
The remarkable success of Angell’s *The Great Illusion* was due to the Cobdenism of his argument, Britain’s rising tensions with Germany and Angell’s pragmatism. *The Great Illusion* was a triumph. It sold over two million copies in twenty-five languages.\(^{103}\) By 1913, there were fifty clubs and study circles dedicated to its cause in what Jacob Heilbrunn describes as a “cult following”.\(^{104}\) The *Daily Mail* called it “clever and entertaining” and later claimed it was “the most discussed book in years”.\(^{105}\) Far from being an artificial “bridge” that united the peace movement around poorly defined vagaries, *The Great Illusion* tapped into Britain’s Cobdenite political economy.\(^{106}\) Angell followed Cobdenite rhetoric when he stated that no “nation could gain any advantage by... conquest”.\(^{107}\) Instead, he argued nations should “create trade” to turn “political power” into “economic advantage”.\(^{108}\) Similarly, Angell’s economic approach satisfied a country increasingly alarmed by rising tensions with Germany, as it appeared more practical.\(^{109}\) Angell’s pragmatism was also appealing. Angell’s campaigns were funded by the specially created Garton Foundation, made up of establishment figures.\(^{110}\) While Radicals and Leftists accused Angell of selling out, the money helped Angell spread the word.\(^{111}\) He was less concerned with his individual purity but rather doing all he could to avoid a war. This realism appealed at a time when war at home was a tangible threat. However, the role of women in the Cobdenite element of the peace movement has been overplayed. Norman Angell’s movement was noted for its distinct absence of women even by the standards of the day.\(^{112}\) Similarly, attempts to create histories of a Cobdenite women’s peace movement have so far fallen short. While Cobden’s daughters did continue their father’s work, their efforts for peace were limited.\(^{113}\) Moreover, the growing international Cobdenite women’s peace movement was made up of women from outside Britain, such as Jane Addams and Rosika Schwimmer.\(^{114}\) Norman Angell’s success was based on what he represented. He was a pragmatic Cobdenite, hellbent on avoiding war, and that chimed with Britain’s anxiety over Germany. Caedel therefore pays too much attention to Angell’s misgivings as a theoretician and shortcomings as a man.\(^{115}\) Angell was important because of the political economy he characterised.

To conclude, there were two parts to the British Peace Movement between 1899-1914. One united a religious peace movement around traditional associations and methods, and the other drove the movement forward using the economics of Cobden. Contrary to recent scholarship, this was a period of transition for the peace movement, from a religious to an economic movement. While Britain’s underlying Cobdenite political economy helped drive this transition, short term factors such as the Boer War and rising tensions with Germany were also key. Stead was emblematic of the political economy of the religious movement, and Angell of the economic. The transition between the two political economies that these men characterised also represented separate parts of the movement, such as the Radicals who

\(^{103}\) Caedel, *Semi-Detached Idealists*, p. 178.


\(^{105}\) *Daily Mail*, (8 January 1910); *Daily Mail*, (6 April 1911), p.6.

\(^{106}\) Biscoglia, p. 105.

\(^{107}\) Angell, p. 32.

\(^{108}\) Ibid, pp. 30-32.


\(^{110}\) Caedel, *Living the Great Illusion*, p. 117.

\(^{111}\) Weinroth, pp. 561-562.

\(^{112}\) Caedel, *Living the Great Illusion*, p. 139.


\(^{115}\) Caedel, *Living the Great Illusion*, pp. 87-142.
campaigned for peace as well as the women’s peace movement. However, the development of this argument is limited by several constraints. Firstly, Stead’s involvement with the peace movement lacks significant academic attention. While Stead’s incessant propaganda left enough primary evidence to make an argument, the secondary understanding of this is limited. Stewart Brown’s recent book goes some way to fill the gap, but this is an area that requires attention. Additionally, an argument driven by a movement’s transition in the middle of a period inevitably leads to less focus on what went before and after. However, the transition from religion to economics was the defining feature of the movement between 1899-1914 which necessitates this approach. Moreover, the characterisation of the movement before and after the transition should be representative. Lastly, the new school of thought which places debates between economic cosmopolitanism and economic nationalism at the centre of ideological debates in the wider period has momentum. It is possible that new Cobdenite elements of the British Peace Movement are yet to be unearthed, particularly for the women’s movement. This could change the relationship between the religious and the economic movement. However, unless the categories of religion and economics are challenged, there needs to be a recognition of the duality of the movement. Overall, the transition from a political economy represented by Stead to one represented by Angell characterised the British Peace Movement from 1899-1914. At the heart of this lay different interpretations to Starr’s question ‘what is war good for?’.116 This question, and the different interpretations of it, are important to bear in mind when discussing peace movements. Analysing the British Peace Movement between 1899-1914 through this lens allows us to understand the effect of context and the relationship between both parts of the movement. The British Peace Movement was not unique here. These two interpretations are fundamental to our understanding of peace, so we need to understand peace through this lens. Steven Pinker’s recent mammoth study of the entire history of human violence includes admirable attempts to understand calls for peace through the lenses of both sides of the argument.117 Pinker is conscious to avoid Whiggish teleology by stating speculation is “where angels fear to tread”.118 However, we need to add proper historical context to the study of peace movements.

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Can the Chilean coup of 1973 and the fall of Salvador Allende be perceived as the “taming of the Left” in Chile?119 - By Cai Green

The violent coup d’état against Marxist President Salvador Allende on the 11th September 1973 resulted in the brutal ravaging of Chile’s left, with the military engaging in a process of “cutting out the cancer” of leftism.120 From the cruel and shocking murder of Víctor Jara, alongside many others in the National Stadium in Santiago, to the barbaric killings of politicians who were thrown from helicopters to drown in the sea, the military junta engaged in a targeted program of elimination with the single aim of expunging even the last vestiges of leftism in Chile.121 The short and long term impacts of the coup and subsequent purge have long been debated despite the obviously devastating effect it had on Chile’s left. Hal Brands has postulated that repressive events across Latin America, such as that of the Chilean coup d’état, resulted in a ‘taming of the Left’, with the collapse of revolutionary tactics and a decrease in activism and enthusiasm, whereas, historians such as Victor Figueroa Clark have countered this, proposing that the radical tactics of leftist groups, such as the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) and the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), shaped the future transition to democracy and made a significant contribution to the eventual end of Pinochet’s military government.122 This paper will argue that this “taming” of the Left simply did not occur in Chile; in many ways the coup and its aftermath resulted in a diverse and radical political movement that challenged and undermined the military junta at every opportunity. This paper will also contend with the definition of revolutionary methods as Brands only highlights violent and direct action in his meaning of ‘taming’, instead, this paper will suggest that radical intellectual thought and broader social movements, such as those of the solidarity movements, can at least to a degree constitute revolutionary action. Lastly, this piece will aim to restore a degree of agency to the Chilean left following 1973, presenting it not as a passive, defeated entity but an energetic and active movement. To make this argument this paper will draw on Tanya Harmer’s approach of ‘decentring’ Latin American history, in contrast to the imprecise conclusion presented by Brands, by drawing on a diverse range of Chilean leftist groups and individuals to emphasise the multifaceted nature of Chilean resistance.123 Furthermore, to escape the trap of broad sweeping statements, this paper will draw primarily on the actions of political groups and parties and instead use examples of individuals to illustrate phenomena rather than to project the action of a single person onto an entire wing of the Chilean political spectrum. In particular, the focus will be placed on the Communist Party of Chile (PC),

the Socialist Party of Chile (PS), the MIR, and the FPMR seeing the actions of these political organisations as being indicative of, at the very least, a swathe of those on the Chilean left. Any individuals who are focused on have been selected for their significance within Chilean leftish organisations or more broadly in Chilean politics or culture. In terms of chronology, this paper will draw on examples from the immediate aftermath of the coup and the following decades as to not be accused of emphasising a very short period to dispel the myth of “the taming of the Left”.

Following the coup d’état, the remnants of the Chilean left engaged in a radical program of reflection on their policies, past, and present following their failure to prevent the rise of the military junta. What occurred was a diversification of views regarding the left in Chile which represented the inverse of the “taming” of intellectual thought. Clotario Blest, a founding member of both the Workers’ United Centre of Chile (CUT) and the MIR, refused to relinquish the forward-looking, peaceful, and progressive stance which underpinned Salvador Allende’s administration. Blest emphasised the importance of the future of Chile and that the new generation would lead Chile to a new democratic future through the means of non-violence. Blest’s intellectual approach cannot be considered a “taming” as he continued the outlook of Allende’s ilk, focusing on democracy and non-violence as the path to socialism. Furthermore, as an individual it would be impossible to perceive Blest as being tamed: his refusal to go into exile, committed resistance to the regime, and subsequent repeated arrests mark him out as an unwavering opponent of Pinochet’s dictatorship. Orlando Letelier, a former minister in Allende’s government whose eventual assassination at the hands of the Pinochet regime would shock the world, continued this emphasis on the future. Letelier, in particular, stressed the importance of memory and legacy, stating that the members of the junta would “be known forever as fascist traitors”, in a speech given shortly before his death in 1976. Furthermore, Letelier suggested a teleological process of progression from Chilean independence in 1818 to the future of Chile as a leftist state, drawing upon Chilean founding father Bernardo O’Higgins, former President José Balmaceda and Allende to highlight the gradual advancement of Chilean society to an ultimate future. To Letelier, the military junta represented little more than an obstacle to Chile’s eventual leftist and liberated future. By contrast, the Colombian author Gabriel García Márquez, who has been included due to the dearth of leftist Chilean cultural figures who survived long after the coup, embarked on a completely new comprehension of Chilean history to explain the fall of Salvador Allende. Márquez completely broke with the general understanding of the position of the armed forces in Chilean politics, arguing that Chile’s “almost uninterrupted parliamentary democracy”, as described by Julio Faúndez, was a myth. To Márquez, Chilean history was rooted in political violence, with the bourgeoisie utilising the military to dominate the Chilean population, drawing on the Santa María de Iquique Massacre in 1907, which saw up to 2000 Chileans being killed by the

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125 Timothy Frasca, ‘Clotario Blest: The past decade under the Pinochet regime has been difficult for organized labor in Chile. The grandfather of the union movement refuses to despair of his country of his ideals’, *America*, 152, 9 March 1985, pp. 194-195, (p. 195).  
128 Ibid.  
military, and the Battle of Santiago in 1957. This trend of political violence can be traced throughout Chilean history, with the Chaucha Revolution of 1949 resulting in the deaths of approximately 30 people at the hands of the military and the police. This view was corroborated by William I. Robinson who argued that instead of a long tradition of democracy a “long tradition of polyarchy” existed in Chile, with the bourgeois classes dominating Chilean politics up until the 1970 elections which brought Allende to power.

It is therefore clear that the 1973 coup did not result in the intellectual “taming” of the Left, instead, a diversification of ideas occurred, focusing on the past, present and future to explain and justify the fall of Allende. While the Pinochet regime was able to kill thousands of Allende’s supporters it ultimately failed to silence the movement and philosophy which brought him to power. This, however, is not to suggest that many surviving leftists did not feel an immense sense of despair following the coup; Allende’s daughter Beatriz who survived the coup, and escaped to Cuba, committed suicide just four years later. However, it is clear that Chilean intellectual leftism did not evaporate; it remained and continued to develop despite the defeat of the UP government.

Consequently, this intellectual volatility triggered similarly radical shifts in the actions and policies of established Chilean leftist groups and parties. After a period of confusion following the coup, the leadership of the Communist Party of Chile (PC) concluded in 1977 that their lack of military capabilities had been a significant factor in enabling the downfall of Allende. Communist politician Volodia Teitelboim had indicated a potential change in policy in 1974 by describing the violent action as “a path not closed” to the PC. Both the PC and PS engaged in a policy of training military cadres in programs held around the globe in Cuba, the USSR, East Germany, and Bulgaria. It is clear that these political movements had not been tamed; instead, they had engaged in a profound rethinking of their policies and began to implement them, despite the dispersion of their adherents, this does not constitute “taming”. Furthermore, the PC can be seen as wholly committed to this line of action as Cuban Premier Fidel Castro vocally opposed the cause of violent revolution in Chile and yet the Chileans persisted. This is not to suggest that the leftist diaspora can be seen as unanimous in this approach to military action; a significant section of the PS joined the centrist Democratic Alliance in 1983 which proposed a democratic solution to the military junta and outlawed any attempt at violence. However, this division was more due to longstanding differences between the political parties which constituted the Unidad Popular coalition (UP) and did not represent a sudden disintegration of the exiled Left. The MIR also began to engage in new forms of resistance, whilst


originally being a somewhat isolated and fringe movement on Chile’s left, the MIR joined the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) just a month before the September 1973 coup. The JCR drew together guerrilla movements from Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay to oppose right-wing dictators across Latin America. The JCR attempted to build a global network of activists and guerrillas to spread propaganda, engage in solidarity movements, and, of course, to undertake violent actions. Whilst the MIR is generally remembered as a violent guerrilla movement which, in particular, was responsible for violent extra-judicial seizures of property which went beyond Salvador Allende’s agrarian reforms, it is clear that the coup also led to the diversification of policy within this group as it attempted to collaborate and spread information rather than solely fight a guerrilla war. Perhaps the most dramatic representation of this major shift in attitudes from Chilean leftist groups would be the founding of the FPMR by the PC in 1983. After subscribing to the Soviet Communist Party’s non-revolutionary approach to détente for the entirety of Allende’s leadership of Chile, the Communist Party’s foundation of a revolutionary guerrilla organisation represents a major break with its past attitudes. Whilst no stance between Chilean leftist organisations can represent any sort of consensus, it is clear that there was a clear diversification of thought as to how to proceed following the coup which represents anything but a “taming” of the Left.

The actions of the MIR and FPMR, following the coup, exhibit the pre-existence and growth of radical revolutionary thought respectively. While Mark Ensalaco has argued that the actions of the MIR and FPMR were pointless, their continued dedication to their revolutionary principles long after the 1973 coup clearly shows that this arm of the left had not succumbed to an ignominious death but, instead, continued to actively fight against the military junta. The MIR, in particular, refused to admit defeat in the face of Pinochet’s rise to power; Castro’s Cuba was ultimately forced to offer guerrilla warfare training to many MIRistas as they soon discovered that the organisation’s surviving members had no intention of abandoning their goals. The MIR’s perception of the 1973 coup hardened their resolve that engaging in a violent revolutionary struggle was fully justified and Allende’s failure to implement this had caused his downfall. Furthermore, the daring “Operation Return” saw dozens of MIRistas infiltrating Chile in 1978 to cause chaos and hamper the regime at every turn; in 1981 there were 212 incidents of bombing, robbery or assassination carried out by MIR members in Chile. Despite all of the junta’s best efforts, such as the establishment of the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), the groups it aimed to eliminate continued to operate and instead of “taming” the left the junta was now engaged in a bloody guerrilla war which it appears unable to win.

141 Ensalaco, *Chile Under Pinochet*, p. 149.
142 Harmer, *Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War*, p. 56.
with their 1984 manifesto declaring that their violent actions were a justified response to the violence of the Pinochet dictatorship.\textsuperscript{148} The group’s choice of namesake, Manuel Rodríguez, further validated their actions as Rodríguez represented a truly justified guerrilla in Chilean culture, his reputation stemming from his bravery in the cause of Chilean independence.\textsuperscript{149} As the FPMR was a wholly new organisation, founded in 1983, it demonstrates that the Chilean left had not been subdued even 10 years after the 1973 coup. While efforts were hampered by disagreements between the leadership of the PC and the FPMR this did not prevent the organisation’s commandos from striking at the very heart of the junta.\textsuperscript{150} Operation XX Century, which was undertaken in September 1986, marks perhaps the greatest attempt to facilitate the collapse of Pinochet’s dictatorship. The operation was a meticulously planned and executed endeavour to assassinate Pinochet, a fact admitted by Pinochet himself.\textsuperscript{151} While the dictator survived the operation, it still represents the great dedication of the members of the FMPR. Ultimately, by failing to kill Pinochet the FPMR essentially rendered itself obsolete as it made it clear that the dictator could not be ousted with violence alone.\textsuperscript{152} However, the outcome of their failure resulted in increasing efforts to resolve the dictatorship by democratic means; in an ironic twist, it was violence which confirmed the peaceful transition to democracy.\textsuperscript{153} Ensalaco has argued that the actions for the MIR and FPMR were in vain and while this may be true on a practical basis, these organisations undermined and shocked the dictatorship which they stood against, and perhaps more importantly, they stood as a constant reminder to both the junta and the Chilean people that the Left had not been defeated.\textsuperscript{154}

This, however, is not to suggest that the remnants of Chile’s left only engaged in a violent struggle against the Pinochet regime; conversely, many Chilean exiles built constructive solidarity movements and lobbied governments and organisations to act against the repressive rule of the junta. The assassination of Orlando Letelier in 1976 sent shockwaves through the diaspora of Chilean leftists. Letelier had acted as the unofficial leader of the exiles in the U.S. and his dedication had been instrumental in galvanising resistance against the Chilean government.\textsuperscript{155} The success of Letelier’s efforts is evident due to his assassination, and that the plot required a terrorist act on U.S. soil, both a challenging and provocative action for a new regime. Furthermore, the evidence that Pinochet personally ordered the killing of Letelier reveals that his elimination was a priority of the Chilean government.\textsuperscript{156} Letelier’s record of achievements mirrors this assumption as he successfully prevented a $62.5 million Dutch investment being granted to the Chilean mining industry and blocked credit from the World Bank reaching the


\textsuperscript{150} Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet, p. 149.

\textsuperscript{151} O’Shaughnessy, Pinochet and the Politics of Torture, p. 121; Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet, pp. 152-153.


\textsuperscript{153} Ensalaco, Chile Under Pinochet, p. 155.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., p. 154; Clark, ‘The Forgotten History of the Chilean Transition: Armed Resistance Against Pinochet and US Policy towards Chile in the 1980s’, (p. 518).


Chilean government. Furthermore, Letelier was receiving $1,000 in funding per month from the PS to supplement his efforts, which indicates that the Chilean left was still functioning as a political force on a global scale despite its exile. This is corroborated by the establishment of global political networks by the survivors of the coup which spanned entire continents; these networks sustained the political underpinnings of Chile’s left, with the UP’s women’s organisation covering 35 countries alone. Solidarity movements led and supported by exiled Chileans vastly increased international scrutiny on the military junta in Chile, which in turn forced the regime to fear for its reputation on the global stage. Mariana Perry has also argued that solidarity movements in Western countries forced the exiles to rethink their stance on the future of Chile, in particular, stimulating a renewed belief in the importance of democracy which spurred the exiles to work to build a new Chile, rather than attempt to reconstruct the Chile of Allende. The exiled community and their solidarity movements cannot be seen as inconsequential as they had a profound impact on the future politics of Chile; Michele Bachelet, a former exile in the German Democratic Republic, became Chile’s first female president in 2006 for the PS.

Certainly, many of the exiles did not achieve their ultimate goal of reinstating socialism; however, their efforts did contribute to the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship and facilitated the re-emergence of several leftist political parties, with both the PC and PS holding seats in Chile’s houses of Congress to this day.

161 Ibid., (pp. 91-92).
commando squads. Nor was this the only approach of the Chilean exiles, with many building effective and popular solidarity movements to stand against the military junta on the global stage, calling into question its human rights record and blocking its attempts to receive investments and funding. Therefore, instead of a directionless, futile diaspora, another image emerges of an animated political movement which employed a wide range of methods to achieve its goals. From intellectual standpoints to practical policy the aftermath of the coup forced the survivors to contend with their failings and channelled their efforts against a common foe. While one would be correct in arguing that an intellectual thought or a commando strike could not bring down Pinochet’s regime, it was, in fact, the culmination of these efforts that increased the pressure on the junta and helped lead the opinion of both Chile and the wider world that a peaceful, democratic resolution was needed. The Left was not “tamed” following the fall of Salvador Allende; it was galvanised and sustained itself for decades despite being scattered across the globe. Few movements could ever claim to hold to such a degree of commitment following such a significant setback, so in this sense, Brands is incorrect in his assumption that the Chilean left was rendered “tame”.

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To what extent was the fall of the western Empire caused by internal as much as external pressures? – By Alice Gustinetti

The Roman Empire has always been considered one of the most enduring and efficient Empires of the ancient world, however its history was constantly marked by conspiracies, political alliances, and significant schisms. As a consequence of one of these schisms, in the fourth century, the Roman world split into two vast territories, later known as the Eastern Empire and the Western Empire. This essay will focus on the last period of the formal Western Empire and the precarious situation within and outside its borders. Through the analysis of specific aspects of this tragic downfall it will be possible to compare internal and external factors which proved to be decisive in the fall of Rome. The eventual aim is to determine whether or not external pressures had a more relevant impact on the Roman decline than the internal problems experienced by the state in this period. This essay will firstly examine Barbarians infiltrations and the influence those warriors and their lifestyle had on the Roman society, along with the new military attitude and the simplification of the economic and administrative systems they caused. Secondly, it will focus on internal dynamics and the process through which the enduring stability fell apart. The primary causes must be sought in the spread of a ramified Feudalism (an increasingly oppressive taxation) and the loss of the ancient concept of Romanitas.

The fourth century represented a period of massive changes for the western Roman Empire, which started to face serious threats from its northern borders. Despite the notorious theories of the historian Alexander Demandt, the arrival of Barbarians in the continent during the “Migration Age” (Völkerwanderung) was not caused by the sense of freedom or love of warfare typically related to these Germanic tribes. It is actually believed that they were forced to move from east to west Europe by the aggressivity of the Huns and by the stable growth of their population. This involuntary expansion made Germanic tribes collide with the neighbouring western Empire, which would have eventually included them in its society. Despite the common belief, once Germans settled in Europe, they did not prevail over the disciplined Roman military by showing a strong “martial spirit” and bravery, but as the Barbarians expert Walter Goffart recognised, they merely exploited the limitations, such a vast entity had in defending its frontiers. Indeed, the Empire was at the same time too busy struggling to


repel Persians and Parthians in the east to be concerned about the situation in the north of the country. Moreover, Goffart adds that the Germanic world did not have unity or cohesion within its social structure and the Barbarian strategy that weakened the Roman authority over the years was nothing more than uncoordinated military activities. Despite this, the military organisation of the late Romans proved to be inefficient against the Northerners “warrior ideal”, a concept which has been often misunderstood by historians and has little to do with Barbarian fighting style. Goffart suggests that this deep-rooted tradition symbolised the active involvement of the whole community in protecting its own territory, whereas the strict Roman division of labour entrusted the defence of the Empire only to military officers and soldiers. As a consequence, Barbarian infiltrations did not play as a significant role in the fall of the western Empire as the subsequent Germanic integration within the late Roman society.

The assimilation of the new Germanic entities by the imperial state represented a gradual process which took many decades and led to irreversible changes in the administrative and economic structure. By the end of the fifth century, many Germanic officers succeeded, mostly by combined marriages, in taking control of several Roman provinces but failed to maintain the internal stability, which had for so long been preserved by the Empire. Chris Wickham, one of the main experts in the topic, underlines that at the same time key elements of the ancient Romanitas such as a good administration, efficient offices and the legal system had been deteriorating throughout the years, driving people to prefer foreign rulers rather than the Roman state, characterised by over-taxation and injustice. With the strengthening of these hybrid entities the links between the central Government and the single regions gradually broke down, and as the expert in Roman society Neil Faulkner reckons, the primary aim of the new rulers became to maintain power and defend their territories from rival neighbours. In André Piganiol’s opinion, who also investigates the causes of the Roman decline and agrees with Faulkner’s vision, supremacy was crucial and Germanic rulers tended to allocate leading positions to influent and loyal military officers, starting a rapid process of militarisation, and establishing over the time more primitive economies. According to Wickham, this simplification was followed by relevant changes in the fiscal and judicial system, the delocalisation of administrative activities around the country and the increasing lack of advanced infrastructures. Among the several external pressures suffered by the western Empire, the most disruptive was eventually the incorporation of such different administrative models within an entity which was already on the verge of collapse.

Although the advent of Barbarians deeply marked the precarious condition of the western Empire, many historians are nowadays convinced that the Germanic integration was mainly caused by a complex sequence of internal issues, which accelerated the degeneration of the civilisation. The origins of this process are related to the expansionist attitude of the Romans and the administrative methods they availed of in conquered territories. Scholar Max Weber believes for example that initially the new regions were organised in urban communities supervised by Roman magistrates, but gradually the powerful landowners managed to shift the centre of the state politics and economy to their inland estates. As a result, he claims that they started to diverge from the central power and to exercise public duties autonomously. By supporting Weber, Neil Faulkner consequently explains that this fragmentation contributed to a rapid deterioration of internal relationships since the central system failed in collecting taxes.


and supplying the Army with soldiers and resources, whereas the new ruling class acquired new responsibilities and strengthened its influence all over the country.\(^3\) This archaic form of Feudalism led the western Empire to experience a deep economic crisis, during which it entered the next critical phase of its downfall.\(^9\)

In an increasingly fragmented state, the lack of functionality of the financial system particularly influenced internal dynamics such as the political stability and the organisation of the Army to safeguard the unstable situation on the borders.\(^8\) By the fifth century, the Roman expansionism ceased and, as the sociologist Richard Stephens notices, cities partially lost the self-sufficiency promoted by the several conquests and the central authority was forced to raise taxes, which were frequently evaded by landowners and bureaucratic officials.\(^{171}\) The over-taxation represented the consequence of many years of heavy public expenses to preserve the old institutions and it proved to be inefficient in fixing the collapsing economy of the western Empire.\(^8\) Stephens, who agree with Weber, declares that this failure was mainly due to the resistance shown by the new local authorities towards the state and the related financial ruin of the nearby urban centres.\(^9\) By quoting Weber then, the dangerous imbalance was followed by a last desperate attempt to turn the monetary economy into a “natural economy” through the demand of tributes and exchange of goods.\(^8\) The poor results achieved through this economic transformation eventually drove the Empire to incorporate Barbarians into the Roman territories and the Roman Army to fill the financial gaps and provide more manpower.\(^7\)

Due to Barbarians integration, the new generation of Roman citizens shared from the fifth century on Roman and Germanic roots.\(^5\) This generational change particularly affected the new ruling class, whose attitude was now permeated by a hybrid mentality.\(^7\) The majority of provincial administrators had a military background, therefore they did not embrace the concept of Romanitas, through which power was gained by an advanced bureaucracy and the decisive control of cities, but as Faulkner emphasises once again, they employed the Army to strengthen their authority and become more independent.\(^3\) As a result, there was a transmission of powers from the less centralised Roman government to the more autonomous single rulers, who were starting to create a solid basis for the future development of early Medieval kingdoms.\(^8\) As Wickham has cleverly pointed out, however, the acceptance of a new hybrid elite and the mistake in not anticipating the dangers derived by the presence of foreign federates represented one of the decisive turning points in Roman history and accelerated the decline of the western Empire.\(^5\) The heterogeneity developed from the sense of adaptability of Barbarian groups and the urgent imperial needs created thereby the perfect deadlock in which clever foreigners were finally able to exploit the precarious situation within the provinces and take the lead of internal administrative dynamics.\(^5\)

By referring to many of the historians previously quoted, the fall of the western Roman Empire can be described as a long-term process of alternate acquisitions and concessions, which have been influenced by internal and external pressures interconnected. Among these historians, Goffart and Wickham particularly agree that this dualism has represented a key feature in the evolution of the state, as indeed the ancient historian Polybius underlined: “There are two ways in which any type of state may die. One is the ruin which comes from outside. The other, in contrast, is the internal crisis. The first is difficult to foresee, the second is determined from within”.\(^{172}\) Barbarian groups did not constitute an

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unforeseen menace for many years, since they had been uncomfortable neighbours of the Roman Empire as soon as their first settled in Europe, but they became a serious threat when the internal organisation of the imperial territories began to fall apart. In this case, according to Faulkner and Weber’s perspective, Polybius statement can be considered true only when the outside pressure is linked to the internal crisis of the Empire. The Imperialistic policy and the delegation of offices to secondary administrators strengthened the bonds between provinces and the central authority for many centuries, but they also turned out to be crucial weaknesses when they were put in relation to the Barbaric attitude and other external factors. The reaction of the Roman government failed to deal with these problems and aggravated the already unstable situation by increasing taxes and entrusting provincials with more responsibilities and independence. The final consideration supports the interpretation of Wickham and Goffart, together with the analysis made by Faulkner and Weber, who claim the impossibility of establishing the decisive cause of the fall of Rome between external pressures and internal problems if they are analysed separately. Both of them had the same disruptive impact since they represent a concatenation of events which in the long term determined the fate of Rome.

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Imperialism and its impact on the environment of British North America – By Tommy Maddinson

Imperialism was a key driver of environmental change in the modern era. It consumed the natural resources of colonies, changed humans’ relationships with nature, and introduced market forces, Old World diseases and new means of exploiting the environment. In this article, I focus on the impact of imperialism on the natural environment of British North America from the Treaty of Paris in 1763 to Canadian Confederation in 1867. Historians such as Harold Innis have largely focused on the political and economic changes of this period and, in an overview of recent historiography, J.F.M. Clark noted that ‘we will be hard-pressed to find a self-conscious Canadian imperial environmental history’. Nevertheless, there were two clear ecological consequences of imperialism in this period. Firstly, the expansion of the fur trade by the Hudson’s Bay Company into the interior depleted beaver and other animal species across British North America. Secondly, British timber demand in the early nineteenth century consumed an increasing amount of the region’s forests and accelerated deforestation.

The large-scale killing of North American beavers for the fur trade was perhaps the most immediate impact of imperialism on natural environments in this period. Between 1780-99 and 1840-9, an average of 263,976 and 77,654 beaver furs respectively were harvested annually in North America to supply materials for European felt hats. Traders from the Hudson’s Bay and Northwest Companies transformed the relationship between aboriginal peoples and wildlife, from subsistence to commercial hunting and increasing commodification. Aboriginal peoples had traditionally followed a pattern of hunting based on the seasons and movement between woodland, parkland and grassland habitats. The demands of the imperial market and the exchange of goods such as alcohol and guns converted this style of hunting into one that was sustained across all seasons and more destructive ecologically. Some aboriginal people criticised the commodification of wildlife: in 1807 one Ottawa Indian Chief protested to his people that ‘You complain that the animals of the Forest are few and scattered. How should it be otherwise? You destroy them yourselves for their skins only and leave their bodies to rot or give the best pieces to the Whites’. Hunting pressure on the beaver grew in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as the Hudson’s Bay Company expanded its operations into the western interior and competed with the North West Company until their merger in 1821. Initially concentrated around Hudson Bay and the St Lawrence River, the fur trade had extended to the Athabasca Basin and west of the Rocky

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Mountains by 1810, with posts being established at Fort Chipewyan (1788), Fort McLeod (1805) and Fort St James (1806). This westward expansion produced ‘a continually moving boundary of exploitation’, where traders would clear out the fur-bearing animals of one area and move onto the next, driving down beaver populations across British North America. For instance, after examining the annual district reports of traders, Arthur J. Ray concluded that, by 1821, parts of Manitoba and Saskatchewan, such as the fur trade districts of Cumberland House, Upper Red River and Carlton, had been exhausted of beaver. Importantly, however, environmental factors, such as droughts, fires and disease outbreaks in 1795, 1805 and 1812, alongside the Hudson’s Bay Company’s efforts at long-term conservation of the beaver by regulating the fur trade, indicate that the process of depletion was not solely caused by commercial hunting and that imperial traders even took steps to “protect” beaver.

Beavers were not the only part of the environment affected by the imperial fur trade. Traders often relied on hunting for food at posts, creating pressure on other animal species: at one trading house on the Pembina, Alexander Henry the Younger recorded that his post of 41 people consumed 147 bison as well as 3 red deer, 5 large black bears, 36 ducks and more than a thousand fish in the winter of 1807-8. Predators such as wolves and wolverines that threatened fur or meat-bearing animals were also hunted by traders and sold; John F. Richards estimates that there was an annual harvest of 16,500 wolf pelts per year in the late eighteenth century. Thus, the fur trade had wider unforeseen consequences for the natural environment aside from the beaver. This impact is reflected by the fact that, from 1769-1868, the Hudson’s Bay Company exported not only 4.7 million beaver pelts, but also the furs and skins of over 1.5 million mink, 1.2 million marten, 1 million lynx and 250,000 bears. Furthermore, the westward expansion of the imperial market led to the over-hunting of bison in Rupert’s Land and the resulting decline from an estimated population of up to 30 million in mid eighteenth-century North America to near extinction in the late nineteenth century. From 1821, the Hudson’s Bay Company became increasingly involved in the buffalo robe trade in the plains districts of Saskatchewan, Swan River and Red River to compete with the rival American Fur Company and maintain a supply of pemmican; in the period 1841-70 it was handling ‘the product of nearly 17,000 buffalo in an average year’. The decline of beavers also affected wider riparian ecosystems across Canada. Richards highlights the importance of beavers as ‘a keystone species whose actions determined the configuration of the entire ecosystem’, helping to construct various river habitats. Thus, the fur trade may have

178 Beinart & Hughes, Environment and Empire, p. 43.
183 Richards, The Unending Frontier, p. 512.
resulted in habitat loss for species such as waterfowl, river otters and osprey.

British demand for timber, used in shipbuilding and construction, also changed the way settlers used the land in British North America and consumed an increasing amount of its forest resources. Britain had traditionally sourced its timber from the Baltic states, but at the start of the nineteenth century the cost of importing this resource had risen substantially as a result of the Napoleon Wars and the blockade of European ports. British North America quickly became the alternative supplier for imperial demand. In 1807, Britain imported 27,000 loads of timber from the colony, rising to 90,000 loads in 1809, and remained a major exporter until 1857, when the differential tariff placed on the Baltic states was removed. The resulting deforestation transformed the natural environment of the colony in a variety of ways, including habitat loss, altered landscapes, new areas for agricultural settlement, raised risk of forest fires and the pollution of waterways. For example, in 1850, Moses Perley found that waste from logging mills was threatening fish populations in the Bay of Fundy by polluting their spawning ground in his investigation of the state of New Brunswick’s fisheries. Contemporary accounts of the impact of logging are also critical. Peter Fisher, an historian in New Brunswick, recorded in 1825 that ‘the forests are stripped and nothing left in prospect, but the gloomy apprehension when the timber is gone, of sinking into insignificance and poverty’.

However, there is no clear historiographical consensus on the overall impact of imperialism on the size of Canadian forests. Arthur Lower argued that, by 1860, many of Canada’s eastern forests supplying the Atlantic trade had been exhausted, with the disappearance of pine in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Conversely, Michael Williams has argued that ‘the forest still dominated’ and ‘New Brunswick was a microcosm of clearing in the temperate New World’, despite the approximately 640,000 acres cleared in the province. Forest clearing was also not uniform across the whole region and was primarily concentrated around the eastern provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Canada. By contrast, forests in areas such as Rupert’s Land and British Columbia remained unscathed, partly because the Hudson’s Bay Company discouraged western settlement. For instance, only about 9,000 acres of the 750,000 square mile area of the three prairie provinces (Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba) had been cultivated for farmland by 1857.

Overall, in the period 1763-1867, imperialism transformed the natural environment of British North America through the extensive depletion of wildlife and the destruction of eastern forests to supply European demand for fur and timber. However, evidence such as fur and timber exports used in this article must be treated with caution. For example, historians have cited the volume of beaver pelts exported as evidence for depletion, but the actual number of beavers killed each year could be higher, due to ruined or lost furs, or lower, as traders could save pelts for the next

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year. At the heart of these changes was the stark difference between aboriginal peoples and Europeans in the way they viewed and interacted with their natural environment: the former relied on wildlife and forests for subsistence, while the more capitalistic latter saw ‘nature as an assortment of commodities, as a set of resources, as a collection of things to be used’.194

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‘Witch-hunting was stopped by its own internal contradictions.’ Is this an adequate explanation for its overall decline? – By Elizabeth Mashova

In order to answer this question, it is necessary to acknowledge the issues the statement raises. First, it is crucial to recognise that the decline of witch-hunting happened at different times across different regions within Europe and its colonies. Within this, it is vital to point out that some areas remain better researched than others and the lack of a comprehensive definition of ‘witch-hunting’, further complicates generalisation. Second, whilst the notion of ‘internal contradictions’ is self-explanatory, it is important to point out that such contradictions were not isolated from other factors leading to decline. Third, the notion of a ‘stop’ to witch-hunting requires caution as there was neither a sudden halt, nor a clear dividing point between legally-permitted witch-hunting and illegal communal violence.

Scholarly attention has been mainly focused on the origins, rationalisation and dynamics of witchcraft beliefs and has until recently, overlooked the issue of decline. Enlightenment thought provides the earliest explanation for decline, based on changes in elite beliefs and the rejection of superstition and ignorance in favour of science and rationality. Naturally, the Age of Reason eventually gave rise to Whig interpretations, explaining the end of witch-hunting as one determined by the end of demonological beliefs. Such interpretations were to be refuted with the rise of social history, most notably demonstrated by Sir Keith Thomas’s work. However, since then historians have not only attempted to provide more comprehensive explanations for the decline of witch-hunting but have also reconsidered issues of continuity.

including scepticism across society, legal reform and socio-economic changes and developments. Finally, the essay will consider the continuation of witchcraft beliefs and illegal witch-hunting, reassessing the changing approach to the study of the decline of witch-hunting.

The first section will examine how the ‘internal contradictions’ of witch-hunting may have contributed to an overall decline, whilst equally considering challenges arising from such contradictions. For the purpose of an essay of this length, the following paragraphs will focus on three main ‘internal contradictions’: the debates around the reality of witchcraft, the problematic nature of evidence, and finally the unpredictability of witchcraft accusations.

The paradoxical nature of witchcraft and the devil’s role within it, reliant on Biblical and Classical texts meant that intellectuals were in a constant struggle to define the boundary between illusion and reality. While treating the crime of witchcraft as a ‘crimen expectum’ contributed towards many ‘witch crazes’, its problematic essence arguably led to a decline in witch-hunting.

Although, there was consensus among demonologists on the role of the Devil as a trickster and God’s role as the only source of supernaturality, there was certain selectivity and ambiguity about it. Nicholas Remy, for example, rejected the possibility of metamorphosis of witches and the Devil’s role within it, while accepting other ideas such as the Sabbath and flying. Remy strongly argues that it is ‘absurd and incredible that anyone can truly be changed from a man into a wolf or any other animal’. It is therefore not difficult to see why the ambiguity of such theological and demonological arguments could have contributed towards an overall decline of witch-hunting. The fear of rejecting God as the only supernatural authority and violating the First Commandment, meant that it was easier to accept the Devil’s power as illusory and question the reality of witchcraft, although the opposite can also be argued.

Following the Reformation, similar perceptions were adopted to other manifestations of the demonic, including cases of possession and exorcism, used by both Protestants and Catholics to disprove one another. The reality of the demonic and thus witchcraft was, therefore, met with increasing scepticism, thus explaining how this ‘internal contradiction’ could have contributed towards scepticism, especially on a more intellectual level.

Conversely, it is just as easy to understand why the issue on the reality of witchcraft may have played a lesser role in decline. Drawing on the arguments explored above, to deny the existence of the Devil would have meant to deny the existence of God, which was inevitably associated with ‘heterodox afflictions’ associated with atheism and materialism, which undermined Biblical ideas about ‘God the Satan’. Joseph Glanvill, in his *Saducismus Triumphatus*, appropriates this argument in defence of the existence of witches, using new scientific developments to further consolidate it. Although, Owen Davies points out the immense difficulty in determining the impact of the sceptical tradition among the elite and the middling sort, it is evident how the views of people such as Glanvill and Robert Boyle would have

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helped maintain more traditional views of witchcraft.

The contradictory nature of the very reality of witchcraft was not an isolated problem of its own, and it was inherently connected to other ‘internal contradictions’, such as that of the problem of evidence in proving the existence of witchcraft. Based on arguments about the illusory power of the Devil, as explored in the previous paragraph, the truthfulness and reliability of the testimonies of accusers and accused was always an issue to be questioned. While there was no doubt about the existence of the Devil and his illusory powers, scepticism about the existence and powers of witches resulted in a ‘crisis of confidence’, perhaps contributing to decline in the long-run. Furthermore, such doubts gave grounding and inspiration for more systematic sceptical arguments, such as those of Johann Weyer and Reginald Scot, providing the intellectual argument for decline. The contradiction of evidence can also be applied to cases involving possession or including child witnesses, having particular importance in possession cases in England and France, and, perhaps most famously, during the Salem witch trials. It is, therefore, evident how concerns about the robustness and reliability of evidence resulted in increased intellectual scepticism which in turn could have led to an overall decline.

Equally, those same arguments can be considered to indicate that the problem of evidence was not always the most convincing argument for decline. Despite the existence of sceptical arguments since the middle ages, their systematisation happened at the time of the most intense witch-hunts in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. While this suggests intellectual scepticism to be a response to the ‘witch-craze’, it equally indicates that such arguments did not stop it from happening. As the judicial system was chiefly concerned with punishing moral crimes in some instances once a person was accused of witchcraft, there was not much hope that anything would constitute counter-evidence or defence. This indicates that the system was interested in prosecuting the crime of witchcraft, with or without robust evidence, and the problem of providing reliable evidence was not always an obstacle to prosecution.

What resulted from the two previously discussed ‘internal contradictions’ was the unpredictability of witchcraft accusations and its effect on the authorities, presenting another explanation for the overall decline of witch-hunting. Malcolm Gaskill suggests that the lack of centralised authority led to intense episodes of witchcraft persecution, but such outbursts, in turn, ‘ended when authority was reasserted’. The unpredictability of accusations would have further destabilised social order, making it difficult for authorities to assert power. This, in turn, would have led to increased scepticism among legal practitioners, causing increasingly higher rates of acquittals. Furthermore, the high financial cost of witchcraft trials in remote rural communities could have further contributed to such tendencies, leading to eventual decline. Eva Labouvie points out that the cost of witch trials in the Saar region was one of the reasons

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leading to decline\textsuperscript{216}. The ‘internal contradiction’ of the unpredictability of witchcraft accusations and the way authorities dealt with it present another possible explanation for the overall decline of witch-hunting.

Nevertheless, if such arguments were completely valid, outbreaks of witch-hunting would have not reoccurred in waves throughout our period and the phenomenon of decline would have been a linear process. To consider that the unpredictable nature of accusations was always a deterrent for authorities would be to ignore the instances in which witch-hunting was used to assert power. For example, the authorities could have used witch trials to maintain their status by legitimising the worries of the community and providing a legal solution for people’s problems and misfortunes. Further to this, the cost of trials does not account for larger decline, as argued by Brian Levack, thus suggesting that communal fears and morality were at the forefront of legal proceedings\textsuperscript{217}. Whether the unpredictability of witchcraft accusations played an important role in overall decline, therefore, remains an issue for further debate.

While the ‘internal contradictions’ of witch-hunting present adequate reasons for decline, a monocausal explanation presents obvious challenges. As demonstrated, the problems of the reality, evidence and unpredictability of witchcraft were linked to and enabled other, ‘external’ factors, which are worth exploring. The following section will examine explanations related to the impact of societal scepticism, legal reform and socio-economic changes.

Scholars have often questioned the extent to which sceptical views contributed to an overall decline in witch-hunting. For example, Levack argues that intellectual scepticism and changes in elite belief did not lead to a stop in prosecutions\textsuperscript{218}. Similarly, Edward Bever suggests that the sceptical tradition ‘did not provide the primary impetus for the reversal of the upward trend in prosecution’\textsuperscript{219}. On the other hand, there have been suggestions that the influence of mechanical philosophy and the impact sceptics such as Scot and Balthazar Bekker have been largely underestimated\textsuperscript{220}. As valid as either side of interpretations are, there is sole focus on elite scepticism and its impact on judicial proceedings, presenting a top-down approach. Such views largely disregard any scepticism within the communities of ordinary people and do not account how popular scepticism may have been a more important factor in decline. While educated sceptics may have not directly influenced lower classes, society at large showed signs of scepticism by early eighteenth century\textsuperscript{221}. Jonathan Barry points out that an average of 70-80\% rate of acquittals was the norm in the South-West of England, suggesting that scepticism existed across society and led people to develop their own explanations\textsuperscript{222}. When evaluating the overall impact of scepticism on overall decline, a more comprehensive approach needs to be undertaken, considering manifestations of sceptical views across society, whether they were influenced by ‘internal contradictions’, intellectual debates or personal interpretation.

The decline of witch-hunting could also be attributed to the decriminalisation of the crime of witchcraft as well as more broad


\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., p. 436.


legal reforms, whose sole target was not witchcraft and magical practices. As previously noted, change in or repeal of witchcraft legislation occurred at different times in different regions, thus affecting decline differently. Indeed, legal changes led to stop executions in some regions of Europe where witch-hunting peaked comparatively late, such as Hungary, while in others, such as England, the Act of 1736 was enacted long after the major witch-hunts had occurred. On a broader level, the increasing professionalisation of the legal sector, coupled with centralisation of authority may have led to less interest in witch-hunting and thus decline. In the Saar region, for example, village locals no longer sat on the High Court, meaning the legal system became more centralised and less dependent on locals which, in turn, resulted in a lesser number of witch trials.

Similarly, the Roman Inquisition’s more comprehensive reforms reduced the number of witch trials, instead only inflicting ‘light penances’. It is therefore evident that legal reform contributed to an overall decline of legally-permitted witch-hunting, whether it was specific witchcraft laws in some regions, or broader judicial reorganisation in other areas. As previously mentioned, the rise of social history gave way to socio-economic explanations of witchcraft belief and its decline. For example, Alan Macfarlane argues that with the spread of integrated market economy, the decline of plague and the increase in welfare support through the Poor Law and administration improvement, belief in witchcraft was pushed to the margins. It would however be too simplistic to focus on socio-economic change as the sole driving force of decline, when a conjunction of socio-economic and other factors would perhaps provide a better explanation. Although Enlightenment thought and progress met popular witchcraft accusations with caution, such developments most certainly did not eradicate belief. Furthermore, the Poor Law did not provide much protection for rural communities where witchcraft remained an ‘economic crime’ and life did not change until the nineteenth century. Labouvie has suggested that in terms of socio-economic change, decline in the Saar region was a result of both improvement in living conditions, but equally a shift in mentality. Although it is evident that socio-economic change did play a role in the decline of witch-hunting, it is perhaps best understood when considered in conjunction with other factors.

As explored, scepticism and legal and socio-economic changes, whether related or separate to ‘internal contradictions’, contributed towards an overall decline, demonstrating the multicausal reasons for overall decline of witch-hunting. As many of those factors changed throughout our period, it is also perhaps important to consider how witch-hunting itself also changed, perhaps assisting decline. The last section will therefore explore the continuation and changing manifestations of witch-hunting and witchcraft belief.

As noted, the decriminalisation of witchcraft practice may have stopped legally-permitted executions, but it did not stop belief. This is not to say that belief remained static and while some elements remained the same, others underwent change. Evidence of methods of identifying witches such as ‘the chicken test’ were found in the nineteenth century, among both popular and educated
culture, suggesting witchcraft belief persisted in society\textsuperscript{231}. Furthermore, as biblical truth and authority remained valid, educated individuals such as Samuel Johnson and William Blackstone continued to uphold witchcraft beliefs, suggesting that scepticism had not prevailed universally\textsuperscript{232}. Indeed, Ian Bostridge has pointed out that theories of witchcraft were ‘alive and well’ in Europe throughout the eighteenth century and were, in fact, far more robust than previously thought\textsuperscript{233}. Such persistence of views among the elite may have affected the decline of witch-hunting, continuing the stigmatisation of the witch. Furthermore, the way in which witchcraft belief changed can also indicate why interest in witchcraft persecution diminished. For example, people continued to use charms and objects previously associated with counter-magic, such as the horseshoe, but ceased to associate them with an organised, demonic group of witches\textsuperscript{234}. This suggests that while people may have stopped fearing witches and their magical practices, fears in maleficium and bad luck persisted, suggesting that this may be one of the reasons leading to a stop in the systematic targeting of witches. Thomas Waters makes the connection that some aspects of witchcraft have been incorporated in modern belief, especially related to the vocabulary of pseudo-science and psychology\textsuperscript{235}. Indicative of the continuation of witchcraft belief are modern-day explanations of supernatural activities, which are now explained through poltergeist or UFO activity, rather than witchcraft\textsuperscript{236}. To this day, witchcraft belief, as well as practice, remain an issue for governments around the world, demonstrating that while it is important to explore the decline of traditional witch-hunting, it is crucial to recognise that many of these beliefs persist in society to this day\textsuperscript{237}.

As belief continued, it is necessary to explore the continuation of witch-hunting itself. Repeal of witchcraft legislation did not deter society from finding its own way of punishing witchcraft. For instance, evidence of practices of communal anger, exhibited by methods such as the swimming of witches continued to attract attention and crowds of spectators into the nineteenth century\textsuperscript{238}. Despite being illegal, the authorities rarely took legal action against the organisers of such retribution, except when fatalities occurred\textsuperscript{239}. Levack points out that the frequent lynching of witches in Poland was largely due to the lack of legal sanctions against such actions, which encouraged people to take justice into their own hands\textsuperscript{240}. Talking about a definite and complete stop to witch-hunting could therefore be largely problematic as evidence suggests that both belief and persecution of witches did continue under different forms. Nevertheless, examining the changes in such practices offers an interesting insight into why early-modern witch-hunting ended.

This essay has demonstrated that the ‘internal contradictions’ of witch-hunting, such as the debate on the reality of witchcraft, the problem of evidence and the unpredictability of witchcraft accusations, can present an adequate explanation of the overall decline of the phenomenon. Nevertheless this essay has also highlighted that such ‘internal contradictions’ were not an isolated issue and should be seen as influencing and related to other factors such as the rise of intellectual and legal scepticism. Conversely, this essay has

\textsuperscript{231} de Blecourt, ‘On Continuation of Witchcraft’, p. 349.

\textsuperscript{232} Davies, ‘Decriminalising the Witch: The Origin of and Response to 1736 Witchcraft Act’, p. 214.

\textsuperscript{233} Bostridge, Witchcraft and its Transformations c. 1650- c. 1750, p. 242.


\textsuperscript{236} Davies, Witchcraft, Magic and Culture, 1736-1951, p.295.


\textsuperscript{238} Davies, ‘Witchcraft: The Spell That Didn’t Break’.

\textsuperscript{239} Ibid.

shown that the assumption and acceptance of a monocausal explanation of witch-hunting decline is highly problematic. An attempt to overcome this has been made through the exploration of other external factors throughout the essay, such as the impact of broader societal scepticism, judicial reforms and socio-economic changes and developments. Finally, this essay has demonstrated that it is essential to consider how belief and persecution changed shape and even continued, perhaps offering a different lens through which the overall decline of witch-hunting can be explored. In conclusion, the ‘witch-hunting’s own internal contradictions’ can be accepted as one of the many adequate explanations of the complex phenomenon of decline.

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The Impact of the Moon on Political History, 1969-2019 – By William Mirza

The Moon landings of 1969-72 were extraordinary events; not just for the new frontier humanity touched in the process, but also the high level of technology they represented. If there are aliens out there, they might be surprised by the capabilities of creatures who, a mere hundred and fifty years after industrialisation began in earnest, had already developed means sufficiently advanced to send astronauts over 384,400km and back again in less than two weeks.

The Moon landings were also extraordinary for their impact on history back on Earth. The progress brought by them knew no bounds, the influence was ‘scientific, cultural, economic and strategic’ all at once.241 The landings and the rest of the space race have brought about major changes not just in the history of humankind’s relationship with the Moon but also the history of Earth itself. The presence or the moon is often overlooked, perhaps because the role of space seems incongruous in history as history is a subject which has so far overwhelmingly been the analysis of events on Earth. Now, as the fiftieth anniversary of the historic first Moon mission and a period of uncertainty over the future of many space programmes, it seems an appropriate time for a general discussion of some of the political history highlights and speculation about the future.

The landings are often interpreted as one of many battles of the Cold War. It is perhaps ironic that the most far-reaching of all achievements of the Space Race was accomplished at least partly as a result of tensions on our own planet. The Moon became a symbol of imperial dominance and space was the ‘final frontier’ (the phrase is believed to have been coined by President Kennedy in 1963). President Johnson summed this up clearly in a 1958 speech to the Democratic Caucus in which he said that, ‘control of space means control of the world’.242 Space was the ‘ultimate position’, or ‘total control over earth that lies somewhere in outer space’, Johnson went in to detail about control of climate made possible through domination of space for instance.243 The race was a ‘display of leadership in the creation of a national effort to acquire a superiority’.244

It was also very much a popular war effort. The Moon has often been seen as a collective human experience, not to be owned by one single person. To some extent this belief may be shifting now, as in the future ‘one source of extra Moon missions will be the private sector’; the fact that it will be the super-rich who will send these missions arguably allows the Moon to reflect world politics in another way too, as this is a natural result of the present rise of global inequality, which some call one of the worst rich-poor gaps in world history.245 But historically, the Space Race, even if it didn’t always include the general public intimately, at the very least caught the attention of ordinary citizens. By the time NASA had started working to send astronauts to the Moon at the start of the 1960s, ‘the American public had already embraced the supposedly infinite possibilities of the Space Age’ (though it should be acknowledged that many members of the public were reluctant, suggesting for example that economics prevented it, that there was no divine mandate for space exploration, or that Earth’s

243 Ibid.
244 Ibid, p.146.
problems should be faced first). Media coverage was mostly favourable however and this points to another role of space in history as a ‘counterbalance for the national psyche’, ever more depressed in this period, as a result of the assassinations of Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr., and reports from Vietnam. This leads on to one fascinating example of space showing clearly, and to some extent determining, the balance of power in an administrative government. Space demonstrated how the status of the executive branch of government in the US grew while that of the legislative branch shrank, a general trend in history from the nineteenth century to the present of the President’s powers growing at the expense of those of Congress, this was accelerated by Johnson through how he approached the space programme. Johnson’s belief was that the President should lead in many issues, but that Congress ‘could and should take the initiative’ in ‘conditions of crisis’, such as after the launch of Sputnik in 1957 which created a ‘vastly enlarged public awareness and a new sense of urgency’ around getting to the Moon. The programme under his administration thus showed how the balance of power had been shifting for the past century. 
There is also a story of individual political gain here; space was thus a political tool which Johnson had to use carefully, he could not have too much power over it in case mistakes damaged his reputation, but still had to keep a hold over it for posterity, receiving ‘major credit’ for the completion of NASA for instance. Events relating to space also embodied changes in power, the presence of Johnson with his ‘diminished’ role at the launch of Apollo 11 in 1969, it was thought afterward, made the change of executive even more keenly felt by America. Later Moon missions have also come to reflect patriotic feeling. China, for example, has arguably the ‘most concerted Moon programme since Apollo’. This links to the present-day rise of China’s power, making space a symbol of dominance once again. China’s first Moon mission in 2007, an orbiter, was named Change‘e, and a small rover of 2013 was named Yuku, both after characters from popular Chinese folk stories. The decision to use these quintessentially Chinese names, from myths which also appeared in posters in the second half of the twentieth century under the hard-line Communist regime, is thus arguably a symptom of an association of the Moon with individualistic nationalism. The use of lunar science is also often explicitly militaristic. America’s 1994 military mission Clementine was sent out to provide evidence for a ‘test for instruments developed by the Strategic Defense Initiative’, India’s missions are also sources of patriotism: the launch of the country’s spacecraft Chandrayaan-1 in 2008 was a ‘matter of national pride’. On the other hand, there was also a peace movement in this chapter of history, perhaps mostly because a certain level of cooperation is required in the inherently hostile environment of space. 1967 saw the ratification of the Outer Space Treaty (by the USA and the USSR as well as other nations), which said explicitly that ‘nations cannot claim sovereignty over the Moon and other celestial bodies’, that space should be a nuclear weapon-free zone and that nations should behave responsibly on the Moon and

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247 Ibid, later in same chapter (page number unfortunately not available).
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid, p.358.
252 Ibid.
253 Ibid.
254 Bernd Brunner, Moon: A Brief History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), Chapter 13 (Before and After Apollo) Spag number unfortunately not available.)
elsewhere, helping astronauts in distress for instance.\textsuperscript{255} Space on the Moon and elsewhere, as a neutral area free of nationhood, has allowed for international cooperation on a huge scale. In a similar vein, both the International Space Station (begun in 1998) and the International Astronomical Union (founded in 1919) identify strongly as transnational organisations. The former has been visited by astronauts from 18 different nations and the latter has 13,130 individual members in 107 countries. The ISS is, politically speaking, ‘one of the most ambitious international collaborations ever attempted’, making it ‘as much a human achievement as it is a technological one’.\textsuperscript{256} The IAU’s mission similarly is to ‘safeguard the science of astronomy’ with astronomers from ‘all over the world’.\textsuperscript{257} The #dearMoon project to send artists in orbit around the Moon in 2023 produced by Japanese entrepreneur Yusaku Maezawa, one of the most high-profile space schemes of recent news, has no military link whatsoever, its purpose the celebration of peaceful culture rather than the spread of violent conflict.\textsuperscript{258} Maybe space merely mirrors history on Earth, the less militarily-minded space programme of today might just reflects relatively more peaceful modern times, in contrast to earlier programmes when the Cold War was still happening. So perhaps I’m overcomplicating this topic: maybe all space will bring is a repeat of the ‘permanent human condition’ in which there will be ‘tragedy and good luck’ in equal measure.\textsuperscript{259} But whether or not history in space ends up being vastly different to history on Earth, maybe as we progress further into the twenty-first century, the Moon will generate more and more of our history; if we return, historians will soon be dealing in earnest with the history of not just one planet, but rather two bodies of the solar system. Will the discipline split into ‘astronomical’ historians who study humanity’s journeys into space, and ‘home’ historians who, quite literally, keep us grounded? As, despite temporary flagging, it seems unlikely that our relationship with space is permanently over (based off the dedication of those who advocate it and the interest of many in it), this seems plausible and may happen soon. Maybe the next generation of scholars, depending on how much farther human beings venture into the cosmos, will argue over whether events should be interpreted according to earthly or space historical models, rather than social or political historical ones, but only time will tell.

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‘There the Cords of Life Broke’: Attitudes Towards Death, Dying, and the Deceased in Early Modern England – By Piers Mucklejohn

Death is the inevitable end of life. Indeed, our conception of ‘life’ is dependent on our notion of death. This fact has remained unchanged for the entirety of human existence and has been understood by humans for as long as they’ve existed. However, the immutable nature of death does not mean that attitudes towards it have not changed. On the contrary, the evolution of culture, religion, and technology have greatly altered our understanding and perception of death. In this article, I intend to look back at what we know of attitudes towards death in early modern England through depictions of it in popular culture. Death cannot be eluded and the concept of inevitability was a well-known and prominent aspect to this discussion in early modern England. In Act 1, Scene 2 of William Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Gertrude tells Hamlet ‘Thou know’st ’tis common; all that lives must die.’ It is this truism, which both makes death something greatly feared yet illogical to fear. An aspect of death’s universality is that it cares not for rank, wealth, or class. This was a popular theme as well in early modern England. Thomas Hill’s famous 17th century

ballad ‘The Doleful Dance and Sad Song of Death’ describes death as ‘a dance that every one must do’ including ‘the beggar and the King, and every man in his degree.’ Early modern artists often incorporated this idea into their work and it was by no means restricted to England. Pieter Bruegel’s The Triumph of Death (c. 1562), for example, depicts a war-like scene in which crowds of people are massacred by an army of skeletons. It features a dying King reaching out for his gold (a sign of illogical human vanity in the face of death) as well as dead and dying people of all social orders, from a soldier to a cardinal. Hans Holbein, the renowned artist of various royal portraits during the reign of Henry VIII, also dabbled in such works prior to arriving in England. In a series of memento mori woodcuts, grouped together as his Dance of Death, Holbein depicts Death (represented as a skeleton in typical early modern – and medieval – style) coming for such figures as a King, the Pope, a judge, a monk, a nun, a nobleman, a soldier, a doctor, and more. Consequently, it points out that death comes for all, regardless of status, and that it trumps even the mightiest of armies and does not care for human constructs like justice. Thus, what became important for medieval and early modern societies, including England, was not if or when a person died but rather how this person died.

In their article ‘The Final Moment before Death in Early Modern England’, Richard Wunderli and Gerald Broce observe that one belief, which was shared by Protestants and Catholics in early modern England, was the notion that a dying person’s final mindset could determine their salvation. In order to provide evidence of such a belief in popular culture, they cite the moment from Hamlet when the titular character decides not to kill King Claudius in revenge for his father’s death

[https://ebba.english.ucsb.edu/ballad/20686, consulted on 22/11/19].


261 Thomas Hill, ‘The Doleful Dance, and Sad Song of Death’, viewed online at The University of California, Santa Barbara’s English Broadside Ballad Archive
at the new King’s hand. Hamlet considers the possibility but then dismisses it, stating that ‘Now I might do it pat, now he is praying. And now I’ll do’t. And so he goes to heaven.’ In an ironic twist, the audience – but not Hamlet – discovers that Claudius, by his own admission, was unable to pray properly to God and therefore Hamlet could have safely dispatched of him at once. What is important, however, is that for all the crimes carried out by Claudius (including fratricide, carrying ‘the primal eldest curse’), if he were to die praying he would acquire salvation. This was a longstanding and widely held English belief. A well-known example was the murder of Thomas Becket in 1170, which was made more rank by its happening in Canterbury Cathedral while he was praying regardless of the veracity of such details. His death became a symbol of the ultimate devotion to God, for which he was made a Saint. This was also the reason behind confessions carried out before execution, designed to make godly the mindset of the condemned. We can learn about such confessions from ballads, which claimed to transcribe them. One such ballad (written anonymously) from 1727 claims to detail the confession of William Stevenson, who was executed in August of that year for the murder of Mary Fawden. In his dying words, Stevenson admits that ‘my poor sinful soul is filthy and foul’ and asks God to ‘take some pity’ on him.

Another (fictional) example of this process can be found in John Webster’s *The Duchess of Malfi* when in Act 5, Scene 4 Bosola stabs who he believes to be either Ferdinand or the Cardinal (both the evil patriarchs of the play) and exclaims ‘I’ll not give thee so much leisure as to pray.’ By robbing the dying of their ability to pray, Bosola can ensure that they don’t get the chance to go to heaven. In this case, and in a cruel dramatic irony which is typical of Webster’s work, Bosola actually slays Antonio, who is a good man. The idea of the “final moment” gave individuals the power to determine their own salvation (a notion that was not supported by the Church at the time) and thus it could both be used by sinners to achieve salvation or by others to deny them of it. Of course, the dying moments were not the end for attitudes towards death, even if they marked the end of a person’s life.

Early modern English attitudes towards death were as much, if not more, concerned about what happened after death rather than what preceded it. It is also at this point that the differences between class and gender become most visible. In terms of class, we can compare the death of Hamlet, who dies a heroic and princely death, with the death of those in service. In *The Duchess of Malfi*, themes about the injustice of service are crucial to the plot. At one point near the end of the play, Bosola kills a servant so that he ‘shall not unbarricade the door/To let in rescue.’ Where the deaths of servants are not entirely devoid of description, they are often undignified. Polonius’ death in *Hamlet* is another example. Hamlet describes his body as ‘At supper […] Not where he eats, but where he is eaten [by worms].’ Conversely, women are often described as beautiful after death, not uncommonly with sexual undertones. The Duchess’s corpse in *The Duchess of Malfi* is so beautiful that it shocks Ferdinand (who orchestrated her murder) and makes his ‘eyes dazzle.’ Similarly, Valerie Traub contends that Ophelia’s body, following her suicide in Act 4 of *Hamlet*, is ‘an eroticized yet chaste corpse’. As a consequence, the role of gender, as well as class, in attitudes towards death – particularly in early modern

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264 Ibid., p. 272.
265 ‘A Song on the Confession and Dying Words of William Stevenson’, viewed online at The University of California, Santa Barbara’s English Broadside Ballad Archive [https://ebba.english.ucsb.edu/ballad/32526, consulted on 23/11/19].
267 Ibid., p. 112.
269 John Webster, *The Duchess of Malfi*, p. 87.
English theatre – is emphasised most following the moment of death itself. What is clear is that early modern attitudes towards death both in England and Europe were primarily concerned with three main aspects: its inevitability, its role in deciding the fate of those for whom the bell tolls and its effects, namely attitudes towards the dead. Although technological advancements, such as scientific discoveries, led to a greater understanding of death and a more developed religion supposedly changed perspectives on death, the underlying (and religiously unifying) view of death as an inevitable and important stage of a person’s life, which was important in deciding their afterlife, remained strong throughout the period and to some degree remains strong today. However, the decline of widespread religious belief and increase in quality and longevity of life has allowed us to try and shun the looming presence of our own mortality which for early modern English men and women simply couldn’t be ignored.

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Secondary Sources
Are nations ‘imagined communities’ based on ‘invented traditions’? – By Maya Skelton

The concept of a ‘nation’ is a false dichotomy, leading the historian to oversimplify the complex socio-economic and geopolitical changes which have shaped our modern world. There has never been a period in history where the physical and philosophical boundaries of a ‘nation’ have remained constant. Thus, to define ‘nationhood’ as anything other than an ‘imaginary community’ would be to assume a logical nature to something based on human relationships and emotion. This essay will discuss the French Revolution, creation of territorial nations such as colonial African tribes and post-Enlightenment Europe, the Kurdish nation as a popular construct and the invention of popular traditions in the British monarchy and Africa. Discussion of nations within historiography has expanded recently as the global economic crash of 2008–2009 led to a mirrored ‘Third Age of Trade’ in modern neoliberal economies, with leaders adopting policies of economic protectionism based on nationalism. However, this essay will focus on the more traditional social history of Hobsbawm, Ranger and Schulze, to posit that all traditions and nations are ‘imaginary’ as all customs have their origins not in a singular event nor declaration but rather a plethora of individual, religious and emotional experiences haphazardly adopted. Thus, although one may be able to define a ‘nation’ in political and legal terms, based on the Treaty of Westphalia 1648, much more is needed to create a sense of connection amongst peoples than commonality of language, government or culture. In its most simple definition, a nation is an organisation of peoples who share dialect, beliefs or customs, separate from a state in that neither territorial land nor a uniform governmental system is needed – instead, “a nation is a soul, a mental principle” grounded in language and the human psyche’s desire to connect with fellow man, making anthropological study challenging as definitions of community and tradition shift. The concept of a ‘nation’ is imagined as the territorial boundaries which define this identity are often created by accident or to manipulate societies; as Schulze suggests, “nations are vague, protean entities, except where they were explicitly and legally defined”. However, such legal definitions are often themselves flawed; for instance, traditional historiography often viewed the ‘Scramble for Africa’ of 1880–1960 as European colonial powers manipulating and exaggerating pre-existing ‘community’ nation boundaries, yet recently this has been reassessed as colonisers creating differences to fracture societies and eliminate resistance to violence by inventing the notion of ‘tribes’, thus essentially inventing such communities. For decades, the traditional historiography of British overseas rule was of Robinson and Gallagher, who between the 1950s and 1980s suggested British rule in Africa started as an attempted ‘imperialism in free trade’ with governance gradually

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‘adapted to conditions found in each periphery’. Robinson and Gallagher argued the ‘nations’ of Africa were informal and accidental, yet recently this has been reassessed suggesting the division of Africa was purposeful to break-up resistance and control labour markets, originating in the 1884 Berlin Conference where European powers cartographically divided Africa for colonisation, irrespective of community or racial identities. Recently, historians such as John Darwin and P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins have assessed British policy of ‘indirect rule’ introduced from the 1900s as similarly reliant on creating ‘imagined nations’; by garnering support of locally important figures, multi-ethnic multi-identity peoples were divided into homogeneous communities, all because “emerging factors made it increasingly different to adhere to established principles of rule”. Thus, creating the false African ‘tribes’ of today as “a nation is a state of mind, a community that exists so long as it is willed to”. Again, nationhood as imaginary is evident in the ‘creation’ of the French nation in the nineteenth century. The modernist Weber, for instance, argues the French territorial state was created long before French citizens saw themselves as a ‘nation’, undermining the idea that sharing a common language and territory immediately creates nationhood. Instead, Weber argues the French nation was formally created through an interventionist government which expanded education to replace local dialects (or patios) with French and used the army to create ‘national pride’. Hobsbawm argues “the invention of tradition played an essential role” in then maintaining this new nation, with “the most important of these, Bastille Day, dated to exactly 1880” and “the symbol of the Republic and freedom itself” personified in the character ‘Marianne’. A study of the socio-political differentiation between official ‘nations’ and communities can again prove ‘nationhood’ is an imaginary construct, based on governmental definitions and historical precedent as “the nation is an imagined political community – inherently limited and sovereign”. The newly recognised Kurdish nation demonstrates how a commonality of language, culture or ethnicity (yet not of territorial land) is for communities evidence of a nation. However, this may not suffice for recognition by the official state, creating a “secondary existence, flowing from ethnicity”. This results in the need for revolt, suggesting that ‘nationhood’ is not to do with the legal formality of governance (instead, this would be nation-statehood) but rather is a “mental principle, an extended community with a peculiar sense of kinship”. Ultimately, a nation is imagined as “even the smallest nation will never know most of its fellow members”, again seen in the Kurdish nation as its citizens are spread throughout the Middle East and, increasingly, in the US. Whether these commonalities – for instance “as you have your language, you are a people”- are invented is contestable since language, culture and ethnicity are continually evolving in definition. Often, socio-political traditions are invented or


281 Ibid.


purposefully created by colonial powers to control populations or identify those who are ‘ethnically purer’. The Belgium authorities’ division of Rwanda into ‘ethnic communities’ (Hutus and Tutsis) in 1935 demonstrates this; these imaginary ‘communities’ were based not on historical tradition (earlier divisions of Hutus and Tutsis was class-based) but on necessity by colonisers to subjugate the colonised and generate inter-society hostility, resulting in the 1994 genocide of an estimated 1 million Tutsis. Following this modernist approach, I believe this proves the ‘nation’ is an imaginary political construct, bearing no relation to historical communal identity, and underpinned by invented ‘traditions’ to further political objectives and manipulate communities.

In his 1762 thesis Rousseau argued ‘community’ is largely invented, and reliant on adherence to social norms and precedents, so “in place of individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a mortal and collective body”. This was a radical idea in the 18th century, opposing feudalism and suggesting that, while basic hierarchical structures remain, each individual has a duty to the whole community to act responsibly, in turn being advantageous as “what a man loses by the social contract, he gains by civil liberty”. Arguably, this reinforces the concept of a ‘nation’ as an imagined state; by extrapolating the micro responsibility of the individual to the macro of an entire country we can see if a “man wishes to enjoy the rights of citizenship without being ready to fulfil the duties of a subject... he [may] prove the undoing of the body politic”. Thus, it is possible to suggest the nation is ‘imaginary’ as there is no consensus on such ‘social responsibility’ – indeed, if there were, the need for prisons and law would have been void far before Rousseau. This can be seen in The Terror of the French Revolution (1793-94) where the concept of social responsibility and community amongst one’s fellow class was confused and led to extreme violence, with no definition of what constituted each ‘community’ outside outdated estate-hood – instead, communities were identified through class traditions including dress, dialect or even regional accent and manners. At least 17,000 civilians were murdered during this period as the newly democratised French state struggled with the concept of a ‘national identity’ without its traditional monarchic base, and thus definitions of communities amongst class and socio-economic standing were confused and re-drawn.

Anderson suggests this socio-economic struggle is inherent to the imaginary nature of nations: “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation...the nation is always perceived as a horizontal comradeship”. Class inequality is at once both an accepted and avoided aspect of the nation, yet once traditional socio-economic strata are removed this consensus is disrupted and definitions of ‘nation’ become “modular...capable of being transplanted to a great variety of social terrains”. Overall, this demonstrates the invented nature of ‘community’, underpinning how nations are imagined as this solidarity amongst peoples often defines nationhood. Thus, the post-Enlightenment concept of a ‘nation’ is an over-simplification of complex socio-political events and human connections, demonstrated in how our definition of ‘community’ and kin can rapidly change in tumultuous events. Moreover, Hobsbawm and Ranger argue “traditions which appear to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes

290 Ibid.
291 Ibid.
293 Ibid.
294 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities.
invented” with leaders “normally attempting to establish continuity with a suitable historic past” to provide a false sense of legitimacy. These traditions often fundamentally underpin the concept of ‘community’ within society, arguably meaning that the concept of nation is itself imaginary. Within the context of colonial Africa, Terence Ranger argues “the invented traditions imported from Europe not only provided whites with models of command but also offered many Africans models of ‘modern’ behaviour”. Although this analysis may be considered racially prejudiced and a continuation of imperial attitudes towards Africans as ‘backwards’ and in need of ‘civilisation’ by colonisers, it demonstrates how traditions were imported to new African nations to “turn the whites into a convincing ruling class”. In turn, Ranger suggests these traditions were used domestically to present colonial rule as civilised, distracting from its violent reality and fostering a false sense of ‘national pride’ amongst the British public who became “inspired with faith in the divinely ordained mission of their county and race”. Linking to the creation of imaginary tribal ‘nations’ in Africa, Ranger essentially argues this invention of tradition was used throughout the British Empire as a way of “running an immensely complex industrial society”. Rapid British industrialisation was reliant on keeping separate the spheres of resource and manufacture, in my opinion to consolidate the British policy of indirect rule after a permanent military presence became too expensive and rulers needed to replace coercion with consent. Arguably, this proves that traditions are overwhelmingly invented and used to prop up imaginary nations as a way of controlling populations, establishing illegitimate rule as beneficial and consolidating power. Instead, if people used their own notions of solidarity and tradition, for example through more national instead of local links in Africa, the resultant ‘communities’ would be far less regimented and more reflective of true human relationships and culture, anecdotally such as those of ancient history. Finally, in Britain this invention of tradition can also be seen in the customs of the monarchy, similarly used to “consolidate its ideological dominance by exploiting pageantry as propaganda” following the establishment of a constitutional democratic state in 1688 void it of its traditional socio-political role. Hobsbawm discusses the idea that, before the emergence of Britain as a colonial power in the latter quarter of the 19th century, most royal pageants “oscillated between farce and fiasco” and were not seen as a source of public pride. Yet, as colonialism progressed, the monarch came to represent this ‘superior’ British power - the institution, “hitherto inept, private and limited...became splendid, public and popular”. Hobsbawm uses the example of coronation ceremonies, altered dependent on the national mood of the time, to show how traditions within the monarchy were often invented or under/over-emphasised in a “desperate attempt to win popularity” in a tumultuous time. For instance, Queen Victoria’s coronation was seen as “a unifying symbol of permanence and national community...a refined and quiet dignity mixing both old and new”. As such, I believe ‘traditions’ are overwhelmingly invented, used to reflect and control the population of the time, and using historical references to suggest a continuity in change - in the case of the British monarchy, ceremony evoking

298 Ibid.
299 Ibid.
301 Ibid.
302 Ibid.
303 Ibid.
ancient British superiority has been used as justification for colonial expansion. In conclusion, I agree that nations are essentially ‘imagined communities’. Political sovereignty of the people would suggest a nation is self-evident in any community which chooses to identify as such, yet this brief historical study has proven that this is often not the case. Instead, definitions of ‘nation’ are manipulated and imposed on society to further and create divisions, justify colonial violence and, ultimately, to legitimise a governmental monopoly of sovereignty which should, in a truly democratic state, lie with the people. Often the justification for this is found in shared ‘tradition’ yet this can also be assessed as false, with ‘traditions’ frequently proving to be the product of the state, used to control society and again provide a false sense of historical legitimacy to power where, in reality, there is none. Instead, I have found that what we often view as a ‘nation’ is, in fact, a ‘nation-statehood’ with state rulers using a tenuous connection of culture, language and belief to impose solidarity amongst people within a political territorial boundary.

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The Black Prince and The Prince
Was Duke Alessandro de Medici the perfect Machiavellian prince? – By Finn Tyndall

Alessandro de’ Medici is one of the more overlooked members of Renaissance Italy’s most famous family. He hasn’t been immortalised in an Assassin’s Creed™ videogame nor a Netflix original series. Born in 1510, the bastard son of a Moorish servant and either Lorenzo di Piero de Medici or Pope Clement VII I, his life stands at the crossroads between the Medici’s eras of being a banking powerhouse of Europe and their time as Grand Dukes of Florence, Alessandro ruled Florence for 7 years, a short time compared to many late medieval rulers. Henry VIII for example ruled 38 years. His peculiar position in the Medici chronology makes Alessandro a fascinating case study in Renaissance rulership. Alessandro was given Florence by the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V in 1530 after a siege which involved the death of “as much as 50%” of the city’s population. His rule was brief but intense, and bears remarkable similarities to the titular ‘Prince’ of Niccolò Machiavelli’s magnum opus. This comparison may seem trite and overly applied to most rulers, but for Alessandro this is no wishful comparison. By the time Alessandro was awarded Florence, The Prince had been circulating for nearly twenty years. Its publication during the year of his ascension to Duke and the dedication to

Alessandro’s official father Lorenzo di Piero de Medici, Duke of Urbino, meant The Prince would have been obvious reading material for the young ruler. Through this article, I will be examining how successful a ruler Alessandro was with reference to The Prince, yet due to the brevity of his rule, success here is how greatly his actions helped or hindered in the consolidation of his position. Machiavelli begins Chapter Seven of The Prince by stating, “Those who solely by good fortune become princes ... have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop.” ‘Good fortune’ in this statement means through the favour of another, i.e. the instalment of a private citizen into a province. For Machiavelli, people’s affections were “inconstant”, there was nothing stopping the giver of a province from revoking his gift. This statement clearly is pertinent to Alessandro’s rule. To combat the issue Machiavelli addressed, Alessandro endeavoured to build a close relationship with the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V. Both during and after Charles’ conquest of Florence Alessandro joined his court, initially for Charles’ coronation and subsequently on tour around Charles’ territories, securing Alessandro’s betrothal to Charles’ daughter Margaret. Although the marriage would not be completed until 1536, the betrothal safeguarded Alessandro’s position. Alessandro’s presence in Charles’ court can be seen through Nicolas Hogenberg engraving of Charles’ coronation, where members of Alessandro’s household appear. Alessandro did not stop his time with Charles after the coronation either, instead spending “more than six months” with the Emperor after the siege of Florence. This lengthy stay ended in a decisive diplomatic victory for Alessandro, with Charles not only issuing a statement confirming Alessandro’s position and marriage to Margaret, but also bestowing upon Alessandro gifts symbolising their relationship, including a gold chain. Alessandro wore this chain through much of his rule, which would have been a powerful symbol of both whose backing he had, yet also who held his leash. Overall, although Alessandro was in a situation which Machiavelli explicitly warns against, he was immensely successful in establishing himself firmly in Charles’ favour.

306 Ibid
308 Nicolas Hogenberg, Charles V Coronation procession, with Pope Clement VII, at Bologne 22nd February 1530. (Appendix A)
309 Fletcher, The Black Prince of Florence, p. 67
Fletcher, The Black Prince of Florence, p. 72
ensuring a safe reign especially through his betrothal to Margaret.

In Chapter Seventeen of *The Prince* Machiavelli advises that a prince “ought not to mind the reproach of cruelty”, for those who employ “too much mercy, allow disorders to arise.” The most important example for analyses of Alessandro’s use of cruelty comes from how he dealt with his cousin Ippolito de’ Medici. Ippolito had become a cardinal in January 1529 when Pope Clement VII “convinced he was dying” awarded him a cardinal’s hat in an effort to retain the Medici papacy. Ippolito had no intention of staying in the cardinalate, however, and instead aimed to claim Florence for himself. Unlike other exiles and enemies, Ippolito held power in the court of the Holy Roman Emperor, having served him as papal legate in 1532. Ippolito utilised this power in 1534 when, allying himself with a group of Florentine dissenters, he petitioned for Charles to remove Alessandro - requesting to be enthroned as the replacement. The evidence for these petitions can be found in Ippolito’s letters to Charles V, in which he writes that Alessandro’s rule is a liability and that “No city... seems more likely to disturb his holy design than Florence”. Ippolito then writes that “Things being this way... there is no quicker or surer remedy... except that I should go to govern Florence”. Ippolito’s petitions to the Emperor endangered Alessandro’s position, and to effectively counter the issue Alessandro perfectly implemented Machiavelli’s advice. In 1535 Ippolito decided to petition Charles V again. However, on the 6th August, his way to court, Ippolito fell ill, and later died of poisoning. There was little doubt within Italy that it was Alessandro’s bidding to have Ippolito killed, and his execution of the act was impeccable. The timing of Ippolito’s death was devastating to the rebels; without the possibility of Ippolito acting as Alessandro’s replacement, the rebels had nothing to offer Charles, and their case collapsed. Ippolito’s assassination is a perfect demonstration of how when Alessandro followed Machiavelli’s teachings he achieved success. In one act not only did he remove the majority of his opposition, but by killing his own cousin Alessandro displayed the lengths he was willing to go to protect his rule.

A Prince’s duty was not limited solely to violence and the elimination of enemies, and in Chapter Twenty-one of *The Prince* Machiavelli writes, “A Prince ought to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour the proficient in every art”. By doing so, the Prince would achieve for himself the reputation of a learned man. In this aspect of ruling there is no doubt that Alessandro followed Machiavelli’s teaching. The Medici had a long and illustrious history of patronage: men such as Brunelleschi, Botticelli, Michelangelo and Leonardo da Vinci all received patronage, often spending time within the Palazzo Medici. Throughout his short rule Alessandro amassed a large collection of art including Vasari’s ‘Entombment of Christ’ and Pontormo’s ‘Venus and Cupid’. After acquiring, “The Entombment of Christ” Alessandro went on to commission several works from and become a patron of Vasari, paying for frescoes for the Palazzo Medici, a portrait of Lorenzo the Magnificent and a portrait of himself in ducal armour. By commissioning these works Alessandro earned the admiration of colleagues, but also demonstrated his own position within Florence, that of the rightful ruler and successor of Lorenzo. The greatest evidence of this propaganda is Alessandro’s Ducal portrait. Within the painting Vasari included a host of symbolism including his seat being supported by people, and a gold rod which as Vasari himself writes, symbolises his “...as prince and captain”. The portrait would have been a stark reminder to all his contemporaries, including his cousin Ippolito, who ruled Florence.

One area of Machiavelli’s philosophy of which Alessandro appears to have ignored is that in Chapter Nineteen, entitled “That one should avoid

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311 Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 43
312 Hollingsworth, *The Medici*, p. 259
313 Hollingsworth, *The Medici*, p. 274
315 Ippolito de’ Medici, cited in Fletcher, *The Black Prince of Florence*, p. 191
316 Ibid
317 Fletcher, *The Black Prince of Florence*, p. 199
318 Strathern, *The Medicis*, p. 262
319 Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 60
320 Strathern, *The Medici*, pp. 105, 183
321 Fletcher, *The Black Prince of Florence*, pp. 115, 158
322 Fletcher, *The Black Prince of Florence*, pp. 116-158
Within the chapter Machiavelli outlines how when one is “held in high esteem” then he can “easily secure himself”. It seems however that Alessandro had little interest in keeping good favour with his people, he appointed Ser Maurizio da Milano as chancellor of the Otto di Guardia, the body of government concerned with city security. Ser Maurizio was known as ‘the Butcher’ for his excessively violent punishments, indeed in his “Storia Fiorentina” contemporary Florentine Benedetto Varchi describes how “just the sight of him [Maurizio] instilled fear”. Alessandro’s apparent use of fear tactics to subdue his populace seems absent from one sect of Florentine society; the lower classes. During his reign Alessandro often spent time walking through the poorer districts “taking the time to listen to their [the people’s] complaints”. This may seem dubious, however upon examining other accounts such as that of Alessandro Ceccherelli, the image of ‘Alessandro the populist leader’ is strengthened. Ceccherelli writes that Alessandro would often play football in the streets with his citizens “as an equal”. Although the fact he was not rebelled against by the populace can be taken as evidence that the above interactions were successful in endearing himself, the circumstances surrounding his death disagree. Alessandro was murdered on the 6th January 1537 by his cousin Lorenzino de’ Medici. Lorenzino was from a lesser branch of the Medici and befriended Alessandro as a child. As they grew up the two grew closer, Lorenzino often acting as Alessandro’s second in command., However on Lorenzino’s part this friendship appeared to be a sham. Seeing himself as “Brutus to Alessandro’s Caesar” Lorenzino murdered Alessandro shortly after New Year’s Day 1537 as Alessandro waited in bed for the arrival of a wealthy widow. Despite his efforts with the lower classes therefore it appears Alessandro failed to prevent himself being despised by the most dangerous citizens of Florence, those closest to him.

Alessandro was not some cruel oaf of a prince, even a persistent dissenter Jacopi Nardi wrote that he “did not lack cleverness”. However when examining Nardi’s wording an important detail is discovered. Nardi used the Italian word ‘ingegno’, which itself suggests not merely intelligence but cunning. It is this word which I believe encapsulates Alessandro and his rule. Alessandro was placed in a difficult position from the beginning, surrounded by enemies. However, it was his cunning that led him to secure himself in these ways. I believe that by following Machiavelli’s teachings more often than not Alessandro de’ Medici achieved great success as a ruler, and his early death should be taken not as indicative of a weak ruler, instead as an exception to the trend of a powerful and well-grounded Prince.

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324 Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 48
325 Ibid
327 Hollingsworth, *The Medici*, p. 273
328 Ceccherelli cited in Fletcher, *The Black Prince of Florence*, p. 157
329 Strathern, *The Medici*, p. 325
330 Ibid
331 Jacopo Nardi cited in Fletcher, *The Black Prince of Florence*, p. 65
332 Ibid
Appendix A


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